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Sirs, count the votes; make strictest scrutiny,
With holy fear, lest Judgment go awry.
A vote o'er-looked may work most grievous wrong:
A single pebble save a tottering house.**

On June 4, 1989, a young man stood in Tiananmen Square in
Beijing and surveyed the array of tanks and troops deployed by the
Chinese government to crush a student-led movement seeking democracy. "Our government is already done with," he remarked to an
** Aeschylus, Eumenides, inGREAT
Hutchins ed. 1952)

BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

88, lines 748-51 (R.
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American journalist. "Nothing can show more clearly that it does not
represent the people." 1 Events have proved the young man wrong on
the first count: the Chinese government has survived essentially intact.
But the truth of his second statement is more difficult to assess. When
does a government truly represent its people? How can we tell?
In the United States, these questions seem to have simple answers.
In the first place, we choose our government by election, so we know
who represents us. In the second place, we do not have to contend with
tanks enforcing the government's idea of who represents whom. Yet,
many Americans would probably be surprised to learn that one of the
first congressional delegates from Virginia, Francis Preston, won the
election of 1794 when his brother, a federal military officer, arrived at
the polls with more than sixty troops who, under orders, threatened
physical violence to anyone who voted for Preston's opponent. 2 Or that
an armed group seized the polls during an 1860 congressional election
in Baltimore and drove off voters under a hail of bullets while the police looked the other way.' Or that in an 1882 congressional election in
South Carolina the total number of ballots cast exceeded by six thousand the number of people who had voted.' Or that bribed, forged and
otherwise fraudulent ballots accounted for fully ten percent of all votes
cast in the November, 1982 general election in Chicago.' Can we be so
sure that the winners of any of these elections really represented the
people? If not, what is the status of officials who win election by violence or fraud, and of the government in which those officials serve?
The advent of the modern, heavily-financed, media-dependent
election campaign has raised even more difficult questions. Many people, for example, think a candidate can essentially "buy" an election by
outspending his or her rival on mass media advertising. If so, on what
basis do we distinguish a candidate who wins an election by outspending his rival on advertising from one who bribes voters directly? Similarly, what is the status of an election in which early media projections
1. Kristof, Crackdown in Beijing; Troops Attack and Crush Beijing Protest; Thousands
Fight Back; Scores Are Killed, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
2. E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA 186-187 (1988).
3. HR. MISC. Doc. No. 4, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1860), quoted in E. SIKES, STATE AND
FEDERAL CORRUPT-PRACTICES LEGISLATION 36-37 (1928).
4. E. SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT PRACTICES LEGISLATION 58 (1928).
5. Voting Rights Act: Criminal Violations, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate JudiciaryCommittee, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 17-18, 52, 55, 72-74 (1983).
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of the winner cause a sizable proportion of eligible voters to stay home
thinking the election is all but over?
In this Article, I shall address some of these questions in the context of the United States government by examining federal elections in
light of the political theories underlying the Constitution. I shall argue
that what is at stake in an election in this country is legitimacy, by
which I mean rightful rule under a Lockean system of popular sovereignty. As a result, election laws and procedures necessarily affect the
legitimacy of an elected government by determining the extent to
which election results accurately reflect the consent of the governed.
Next, I shall argue that these factors suggest that the Constitution
should be read to grant Congress broad power to enact election laws
aimed at enhancing electoral accuracy, and that numerous judicial decisions striking down such laws on first amendment grounds rest on an
incomplete analysis of the government interests at stake.
More specifically, Part I of this Article argues that the Constitution should be understood to embody a Lockean theory of popular sovereignty. Part II argues on the basis of this theory that election laws
play a significant role both in implementing popular sovereignty and in
mediating governmental legitimacy by enhancing electoral accuracy.
Part III examines a group of what I call "Newtonian" election laws
that attempt to prevent the most basic forms of election fraud, and the
favorable treatment such laws have generally received from the Supreme Court. Finally, Part IV examines recent election laws that also
attempt to enhance electoral accuracy, but which have been struck
down-for inadequate reasons, I will argue-on first amendment
grounds.
I.

THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED AS THE BASIS OF GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY

I begin my analysis from the following premise: the legitimacy of
the United States government-that is, its rule by right rather than by
force-rests on the consent of the governed.
Not long ago, that premise would have required little explanation,
and certainly no defense as the starting point for a work of constitutional analysis. The premise is based on the language of the Declaration of Independence: "governments . . . deriv[e] their just powers
from the consent of the governed." 6 The Declaration, according to Carl
6.

The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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Becker and other prominent theorists of the first half of this century,
draws directly on the political theories of John Locke.7 Locke's theories, in turn, were thought to have provided a comprehensive rationale
not only for the American Revolution, which the Declaration sought to
justify, but also for the founding of a new nation. The Constitution, in
this view, merely consummated the triumph of Lockean ideology by
putting the ideas contained in the Declaration into a practical form,
suitable for establishing and guiding a government. 8 Thus, to take the
Lockean premise set forth in the.preceding paragraph as the starting
point for a work of constitutional analysis would have given the ensuing
argument a respectable pedigree indeed.
In the last two decades, however, this formerly orthodox view of
the founding has been not so much revised as hooted off the historical
stage. There has been an explosion of scholarly rethinking of the ideological origins of the Revolution and its two main documents, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Historians and philosophers have identified a wide variety of significant influences on the
revolutionary generation that are said to stand independently alongside,
or contradict entirely, the ideas of Locke. One school of thought
stressing the classical republicanism of the founders has had an especially devastating impact on the central status formerly accorded to
Locke in constitutional theory.9
These developments must give pause to anyone who wishes to argue that the Constitution can or ought to be read in any way, however
limited, that smacks of Locke. Nevertheless, the results of this revisionism have not undermined in any important way the orthodox view that
the United States government derives its legitimacy, in the Lockean
sense, from the consent of the governed. But because the validity of a
Lockean reading of the Constitution can seemingly no longer be taken
for granted, I will explain why such a reading is justified in this case.
7.

C.

BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

DATIONS

OF AMERICAN

AMERICA

(1955).

CONSTITUTIONALISM

(1922); A.

MCLAUGHLIN, THE FOUN-

(1961); L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN

8. E.g., A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 63-84, 103-104. Even Charles Beard, who viewed
the political theories offered to justify the Constitution as little more than a thin'disguise for the
protection of the economic interests of the wealthy classes, characterized the political justifications

for the Constitution in Lockean language. C.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 10-11

BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

(1913).

9. See infra text accompanying notes 22-40.
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The Reshaping of the HistoricalLandscape
1.

The Identification of Multiple Influences on the Founders

The historical revisions that have undermined the former view that
the founding was essentially a monolithic Lockean event may be
grouped broadly, if imperfectly, into several categories. First, historians
have begun to pay much greater attention, and to attribute far greater
influence, to numerous philosophers of the Enlightenment era besides
Locke. Students of the founding period have not only elevated the status of such traditionally acknowledged sources as Montesquieul 0 and
Hume," but have added to the list of philosophers whose ideas are

thought to have significantly influenced the revolutionary generation
such thinkers as Sidney, 2 Harrington," Hutcheson," Burlamaqui,15
Blackstone,"6 Adam Smith and other figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, 17 and Isaac Newton."

Second, historians have devoted greater

10. E.g., Muller, The American Framers'Debt to Montesquieu, in THE REVIVAL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 87 (J. Muller ed. 1988); Kesler, The Founders and the Classics, in THE REVIVAL
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 43, 48 (J. Muller ed. 1988); T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM 125 (1988); F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 66-70, 260 (1985); D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST
114 (1984); G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 179-181 (1981) [hereinafter G.
WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA].
11. E.g., T. PANGLE, supra note 10, at 125; F. McDONALD, supra note 10, at 66-67; see
generally M. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987); G. WILLS,
EXPLAINING AMERICA, supra note 10.
12. See Robbins, Algernon Sidney's Discourses, 4 WM & MARY Q. 267 (1947); B. BAILYN,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 34 (1967); F. MCDONALD, supra
note 10, at 66-67.
13. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975) [hereinafter J. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT]; Pocock, HistoricalIntroduction,in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES
HARRINGTON (J. Pocock ed. 1977); F. MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 66-67; but see F. McDoNALD, supra note 10, at 75-76 n.35.
14. G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1979)
[hereinafter G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA]; D. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 65; F. MCDONALD,
supra note 10, at 55.
15. M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978).
16. F. MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 186-88, 209; West, The Classical Spirit of the
Founding,in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1, 5-

6 (J. Barlow, L. Levy, & K. Masugi eds. 1988).
17. See generally G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA, supra note 14; but see Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment:A Critique of Garry Wills's Inventing America, 36 WM. &
MARY Q. 503 (1979) (critical review of Wills); K. LYNN, FALSIFYING JEFFERSON, 1978 Commentary 6 (same).
18. See G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA, supra note 14, at 93, 97; Commager, America and
the Enlightenment, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 247, 248-49; see also C. BECKER, supra note 7, at 40-51. Several others
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attention to the influence of Christian thought on the founding, including the role of biblical notions of covenant in Puritan and Calvinist

thought.1"
A third broad strain of recent historical reexamination focuses on
the colonists' prior experience with self-government, including the
lengthy pre-revolutionary experience with charters, compacts, and state
constitutions.2 0 A fourth result of the explosion of historical revision
has been the ideological severing of the Revolution from the framing of

the Constitution. Rather than regarding the framing of the Constitution as the logical consummation of the Revolution, Gordon Wood and
his followers view the period between 1776 and 1787 as one of tremendous ideological ferment. As a result, these theorists regard the ideas
that led to the Declaration of Independence as unreliable-indeed, mis-

leading--indicators of the ideas contained in the Constitution.

1

The final and most important revisionist movement, however, is
associated with classical or civic republicanism. This school views the
ideas of Aristotle and other classical philosophers, as filtered through
the thought of Machiavelli and Harrington, among others, as equally,
if not more, important an influence on the founders as the thought of
Locke.
would add Thomas Hobbes to this list of influential thinkers. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
7-8 (1985); Mensch & Freeman, A
Republican Agenda for Hobbesian America?, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 581 (1989). But while the indirect influence of Hobbes is great, as one of the earliest and most powerful exponents of a natural
law-based theory of equality and popular sovereignty, his direct influence seems to have been
small, Fuller, On Hobbes and the Character of the American PoliticalOrder, in THE REVIVAL OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 10, at 69, 70 (J. Muller ed. 1988), or even negative, as one whose
ideas were to be avoided. E.g., E. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 79 n.2 (influence of Hobbes' ideas on
evolution of notion of popular sovereignty lay in "simple revulsion from them").

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

19. E.g., Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism:Christianity,Republicanism, and Ethics
in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1987); D. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 24-25 (1988); Elazer, The Political Theory of Covenant: Biblical
Origins and Modern Developments, in COVENANT, POLITY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (D. Elazer
& J. Kincaid eds. 1980); see also A. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 66-83.
20. E.g., D. LUTZ, supra note 19; G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 232-36, 260-75 (1969); Peterson, Thomas Jefferson, the Founders, and Constitutional Change, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 16, at 275; E. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 122-47; see also D. LOVEJOY, THE GLORIOUS
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA (1972) (describing colonial revolts that accompanied the Glorious
Revolution in England).
21.

G. WOOD, supra note 20; but see M. WHITE, supra note 11, at 208-12.
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The Republican Revival

many variations, the republican view of the
Although it appears .in
founding holds in essence that the Constitution was drafted under the
influence of a loose Federalist "republican" ideology. This ideology derived in great measure from the thought and writings of the Whig or
"country" parties of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, an
ideology which itself originated in the radical ideology of the English
Civil War and the Commonwealth period.2 2 In varying, degrees, proponents of the republican thesis view this body of thought as drawn to a
significant extent from classical political philosophy. 23 Thus, ideas of
corruption, civic virtue, the common good, participatory citizenship,
and the like, current during the period of the American founding, can
best be explained, some historians argue, within the framework of
classical and Machiavellian republican thought.24 This theory marks a
radical break with the traditional Lockean orthodoxy. It suggests not
only that Locke was far less influential during the founding period than
previously thought, but that the founders operated under an ideology in
many ways antithetical to Lockean philosophy. 25 Not surprisingly, proponents of republicanism have argued that Locke's influence on the
Revolution has been highly overrated, and that our view of the founding should therefore be radically revised. While comparatively few
might agree with Pocock that the Constitution ought to be seen as the
"last act of the civic Renaissance, '"26 students of the founding seem to
agree that the influence of classical republicanism during that period
27
"is no longer in doubt."
There are at least two reasons why students of the Constitution
should hesitate to embrace wholeheartedly this so-called "republican
revival." First, exponents of republicanism have been distressingly
vague about its fundamental tenets. The founders' republicanism is said
to have its roots in classical political thought, but that label covers an
enormous amount of ground. Part of the confusion over the "protean
The first influential work to make this connection was B. BAILYN, supra note 12.
The two most influential works are G. WooD, supra note 20, and J. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 13.
24. See, e.g., G. WooD, supra note 20, at 46-90; J. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLAN MO"MENT, supra note 13, at 506-52. Many other historians have elaborated on this theme. See generally The Creationof the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views and Reviews, 44
WM. & MARY Q. 549 (1987).
25. See infra note 29.
26. J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 13, at 462.
27. Kloppenberg, supra note 19, at 14.
22.
23.
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of republicanism undoubtedly stems both from the loose

way in which the term is used, and from the failure of its advocates to
identify precisely the scope of classical republican influence in the wide
variety of spheres that makes up the body of political thought. For instance, do exponents of republicanism mean to suggest the existence of
a classical strain in the framers' thinking concerning human nature?
slavery? the origins of government? the proper objects of government?
the best forms of government? the nature of law? the nature of the
common good? the good life? All of these were principal preoccupations of classical political philosophy, yet it seems clear that the founders rejected many of the classical answers to these questions, if not the

very questions themselves.2 9
Second, even if exponents of republicanism mean to lay claim to
only a modest portion of the political thought of the founders, their
claims may still be overstated. Numerous historians, writing well after
the deluge of republican-inspired scholarship, continue to endorse the
orthodox view that Locke was the principal influence on the political
thought of the framers of America's founding documents.3 0 In addition,
several of the leading proponents of classical republicanism appear to
28. Appleby, Republicanism and Ideology, 37 AM. Q. 461, 461 (1985).
29. To take just one example, Aristotle taught that political society originates naturally-that man is by nature a political animal, that he reaches his highest fulfillment in political
life, and that the polis is conceptually "prior to" the individual. ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE'S POLITics, Bk. I, ch. 2, at 9-12 (B. Jowett trans. 1905). The founders, in contrast, clearly held the
Lockean view that, while natural conditions may well impel men toward the formation of societies,
the establishment of society is nevertheless an act of reason, and that individuals are "prior to"
and possess more complete sovereignty than the society or the state. See infra text accompanying
notes 41-54. See T. PANGLE, supra note 10, at 54-56 (distinguishing classical from modern views
of liberty and virtue in the political context); Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American
Constitutionalism,98 YALE L.J. 449 (1989) (classical thinkers did not distinguish reason and will,
which furnishes the basis for the framers' distinction of political legitimacy from political truth);
Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 13 (1986) ("Jeffersonians were never strictly classical in their
republicanism"); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1558 (1988)
(some framers manifested "a rejection of central features of traditional republicanism").
30. E.g., West, supra note 16, at 4 ("the evidence is overwhelming that Locke was the
leading authority on the principles of government for the Americans who made the Revolution");
M. WHITE, supra note 15, at 5 (Locke's influence "goes without saying"); id. at 64-65 passim
(Locke's Two Treatises an "important antecedent of the Declaration's philosophical truths"); T.
PANGLE, supra note 10, at 126 (by late eighteenth century there was a "largely Lockean consensus on political first principles"); Kesler, supra note 10, at 49 (ultimately even Wood, Pocock, and
others agree with the "prevailing interpretation that the Constitution is a work of modern or
Lockean political theory"); Lewis, Adam Smith and the Moral Theory of Liberal Constitutionalism, in THE REVIVAL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 10, at 104 (Declaration of Independence is largely condensation of Locke).
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have retreated somewhat from earlier claims.31 Moreover, the most recent historical work seems to point toward a possible synthesis view-a
"historiographical convergence" in the words of one recent commentator 3 -in which classical republicanism is thought to have played a
role, but by no means a dominant role, in the founding of the United
States.3 3
Unfortunately, attempts by legal scholars to draw upon the work
of revisionist historians have only increased the confusion surrounding
the meaning and significance of the framers' republicanism. Some commentators have defined their notion of classical or civic republicanism
so broadly-for example, to include within its scope not only the classics but also Hobbes, Harrington, Locke and John Adams-as to seriously impair the usefulness and coherence of the term. 34 Others have
defined it as nothing less than the Madisonian understanding of republican government, expressed in FederalistNo. 39, of self-rule through
limited government.3 5 This definition, as I shall show below, suggests, if
anything, an Enlightenment concept of popular sovereignty-the very
strand of political thought against which republicanism is said to
stand, 6 and very possibly one that is founded on fundamental assumptions inconsistent with republicanism's basic tenets. 37 Recent attempts
by theorists to use republicanism as the basis for proposed reconsiderations of constitutional and legal doctrines add to the confusion by borrowing selectively from classical republican thought and employing distinctly non-classical methods of analysis and argument.3 8 Some critics
31. See Banning, supra note 29; Pocock, Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis
and the Ideologia Americana, 48 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 325, 336-346 (1987) [hereinafter Pocock, Gog
and Magog].
32. Onuf, Reflections on the Founding: ConstitutionalHistoriographyin BicentennialPerspective, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 341, 351 (1989).
33. See Banning, supra note 29.
34. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633,
1634 (1988).
35. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1663 (1988); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31, 46-47 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; see G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (1986).
36.- See Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-18
(1986) (Republicanism, though "not a well-defined historical doctrine," represents a "normative
political vision to set against the vision believed to have predominated in the thought of the framers and in the Constitution they framed.").
37. See supra note 29.
38. To give but one example, the whole republican revival can be seen as a kind of Humean
enterprise. Hume rejects the natural rights-based philosophy of government propounded by Locke
and others. According to Hume, the ultimate foundation of government is "opinion." D. HUME, Of
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have thus argued that advocates of republicanism are in fact offering
what amounts to "a contemporary political theory '3 9 rather than a revisionist-inspired reinterpretation of the political thought underlying
the Constitution.40
the First Principles of Government, in

HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

307 (H.

Aiken ed. 1948). That is, governments obtain popular obedience on the basis of habit and acquies-

cence rather than from any right-laden act of sovereign consent, although Hume concedes that
occasionally governments are founded on actual consent. D. HUME, Of the Original Contract, in
HUME's MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 356, 358 (H. Aiken ed. 1948). Consequently, a
Humean inquiry would ask the question: what justification for the existence of the government is
necessary to capture the opinion-and hence obedience-of the people? Max Weber developed
this concept in the sociological context with the idea of "legitimacy." For Weber, a social order is
"legitimate" when it commands popular belief that obedience is obligatory. 1 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 31-38 (1968); see generally id. at
212-301. But see Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIs. L. REV.
379 (Weberian concepts fail to explain public obedience to law).

In many respects, the republican movement can be explained as a rejection of the traditional
Lockean explanation for the continued rightfulness of governmental claims to obedience, which
rests, for generations subsequent to the founding generation, on tacit consent expressed in most
cases by continued residence in the state exercising jurisdiction. See infra note 54. Proponents of
republicanism seem to be searching cautiously for some foundation on which to base a Humean
opinion (or Weberian belief) that would justify personal or generational obedience to a government that claims to rest on principles with which advocates of republicanism seem dissatisfied.
See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1566-71 (1988) (articulating a version of "liberal republicanism"). The new republicans thus have much in common with
democracy theorists such as Alexander Bickel and John Hart Ely who have sought to understand
the institution of judicial review in distinctly non-Lockean terms. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); cf. Griffin, What is Constitutional Theory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 493 (1989).
39. Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1707 (1988).

40. One often gets the impression that proponents of republicanism are stretching to find
evidence to support their view. For example, Sunstein has argued that the federal due process
requirement of rationality emerges from republican preferences for deliberation and for justification of actions by reference to the common good. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 35, at 29. But one

could just as easily, and in my view more plausibly, describe rational basis review as rooted in
Lockean notions of the illegitimacy of arbitrary government, which Locke viewed as a form of

political slavery forbidden by natural law. See J. LOCKE,

THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT

§§ 17, 22-24, 135-137, 159-168, at 14-15, 17-18, 70-73, 83-88 (C. Macpherson ed. 1980) (1690)
[hereinafter J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE]; see also Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987) (founders did not intend Constitution to displace natural

law). Indeed, the rationality requirement developed to protect citizens from governmental actions
thought to be "arbitrary and capricious." See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123-124
(1889) (concept of due process derived from English doctrine designed to secure individuals from
arbitrary actions of the king); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935)
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard of review to fourteenth amendment due process
claim). For a recent critique of the republicanism advanced by legal academics, see Sandalow, A
Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 523 (1989).
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While these difficulties tend to undermine the force of the grandest
claims on behalf of the framers' republicanism, they fall far short of
rescuing Locke from the wings of the founding drama. There can be
little doubt that republican thought played some role in the founding-the question is what role it played, and with respect to what aspects of the constitutional plan. At best, the relative influence of Enlightenment Lockeanism and classical republicanism on the founding
remains murky. It would be impossible here to attempt any kind of
comprehensive constitutional integration of these different strands of
thought, and it is not my purpose to do so. Nevertheless, I shall offer
what I consider an exceedingly modest and uncontroversial proposal,
although one which could potentially serve as a point of reference for
future thinking about the more difficult aspects of resolving Lockean
and republican influences on the Constitution. My proposal is this: first,
whatever else it may encompass, the Constitution reflects a theory of
popular sovereignty in which governmental legitimacy is based on the
consent of the governed; second, this theory is essentially Lockean.
B.

PopularSovereignty and the Consent of the Governed
1. Some Basics of Lockean Theory

Before turning to the reasons why I believe the Constitution is
based on a Lockean theory of popular sovereignty, I would like to state
explicitly my conception of that theory. I also wish to address in what
sense I consider the theory of popular sovereignty expressed in the Constitution to be Lockean. To take the second problem first, I must confess to some misgivings about the use of the term "Lockean." Although
the theory of popular sovereignty set forth below is found in the pages
of Locke's Second Treatise, very similar ideas or traces of such ideas
are also found in works by a great many seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury philosophers including such diverse thinkers as Hobbes, Sidney,
Hutcheson, Burlamaqui," and even Grotius, Pufendorf and, to a certain extent, Blackstone,4 2 not to mention popularizers such as the pam41. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J. Plamenatz ed. 1963) (1651); A. SIDNEY, DISCOURSES
CONCERNING GOVERNMENT (1698); F. HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (A. Kelley ed. 1968) (1755); J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW (T: Nugent trans. 1748) (Philadelphia 7th ed. 1832).
42. H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACiS LIBRI TRES, Bk. I, ch.3, § 8, at 103-106, Bk. 11,
ch.5, § 17, at 249, Bk. II, ch.6, §§ 3-4, at 260-62, Bk. II, ch.7, § 14, at 281, Bk. II, ch.7, § 27, at
289-90 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925) (1646); S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI
OCTO (C. Oldfather & W. Oldfather trans. 1934) (1688). 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
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phleteer Thomas Paine.4 3 Because various historians have argued that
one or another of these thinkers had a greater influence on the founders
than the orthodox Lockean view admits, to call the constitutional theory of popular sovereignty "Lockean" may be a bit misleading.
Despite these misgivings, I shall describe the ideas below as
"Lockean" for three reasons. First, other words seem to have just as
much or more potential to mislead." Second, there is at least some
historical evidence that Locke was the source, if not directly then indirectly, of the framers' notions of popular sovereignty. "5 Third, Locke is
often considered to be the most articulate exponent of these ideas,
which were so commonplace by 1776 as to be considered "the common
sense of the matter.' 46 I shall, however, give parallel citations, where
appropriate, to thinkers other than Locke who have advanced substantially similar ideas.
The relevant aspects of Locke's theory of government are as follows. Locke takes the state of nature as his starting point, and argues
that autonomous individuals, self-ruling as a matter of natural law, volBk. I, § 2, at 38-41 (rep. ed. 1966) (1765).
65-68 (I. Kramnick ed. 1984) (1776).
44. I have tried on for size and rejected a number of alternatives. "Enlightenment" captures
the sense of widespread acceptance of the theory of popular sovereignty during and preceding the
founding period, but also captures a vast array of other ideas that go far beyond popular sovereignty; it thus suffers from the same defects of vagueness as "classical republicanism." "Rationalist" successfully broadens the focus from Locke to others of his stripe, but suggests an emphasis
on rationalist epistemology, which is not essential to the constitutional theory of popular sovereignty. See M. WHITE, supra note 11 (describing epistemological eclecticism of the framers).
"Contractarian" is good insofar as it focuses on a much narrower aspect of Lockean thought than
the broad term "Lockean" suggests. A contractarian focus, however, is too narrow because it stops
a bit short of gathering in the concept of government by consent, which is critical to the analysis I
pursue below. In addition, the term masks a good deal of diversity of thought. See generally M.

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,

43. See T.

PAINE. COMMON SENSE

THOMPSON, IDEAS OF CONTRACT IN ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE AGE OF JOHN LOCKE

(1987). "Constitutionalist" picks up what "contractarian" omits, but carries far too much additional baggage to be useful. See D. LUTZ, supra note 19, at 24-25 (describing variety of sources of
constitutionalism). The neologism "sovereigntist" focuses properly on the idea of sovereignty, but
gives no clue as to what type of sovereignty is meant. "Popular sovereigntist" would be just right
if it were not so cumbersome and ugly. I invite suggestions.
45. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
46. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), reprinted in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 719 (A. Koch & W. Peden 1st ed. 1944).
Carl Becker has suggested that Locke's influence was magnified by the fact that "men are
influenced by books which clarify their own thought, which express their own notions well, or
which suggest to them ideas which their minds are already predisposed to accept." C. BECKER,
supra note 7, at 28. See also D. LUTZ, supra note 19, at 114 (Americans "fastened upon[Locke's] clear, efficient vocabulary for expressing what they had already been doing for years");
West,-supra note 16, at 30 (government by consent of the governed is "the Lockean principle").
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untarily agree to band together into a civil society for their own mutual
security and advantage.4 7 As a central feature of this transaction, each
member of the society surrenders his natural right of self-rule to the
collective society. This exchange usually, although not always, results
in a binding agreement to abide by the will of the majority of the soci-

ety's members."8
Having entered into a self-governing society, society's members,
also known as "the people," generally find it advantageous to create a
government to handle the chores associated with collective self-rule.

The creation of a government, though largely a matter left to the people's discretion, involves at a minimum the appointment of a legislator
to make laws binding on all members of society. 49 The government,
47. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 4, 87, 89 at 6, 46-48. Cf T. HOBBES, supra note 41, ch. 13, at 141-43 (men naturally equal; state of nature is state of war); A.
[for] convenience, safety and
SIDNEY, supra note 41, at 60 (families join into "one civil Body ...
defence"; this was "a collation of every man's private Right into a Public Stock"); id. at 22-23; F.
HUTCHESON, supra note 41, at 281 ("the first state constituted by nature itself"); id. at 3:4, 21214 ("dangers or miseries attending a state of anarchy" exceed "inconveniences" of submitting
"with others" to rule of governors); J. BURLAMAQUI, supranote 41, Bk. II, ch.5, § 17, at 26-27 (in
"primitive and original state ... every man is naturally master of himself"), at 13 ("civil society
is nothing more than the union of a multitude of people"); H. GROTIUS, supra note 42, at 249
("public associations" formed by "a people or by peoples"); S. PUFENDORF, supra note 42, at 974
(first step to establishing state is "to enter into an agreement, every individual with every other
one, that they are desirous of entering into a single and perpetual group"); J. MILTON, TENURE OF
KINGS AND MAGISTRATES 9 (W. Allison ed. 1911) (1649) (men born free, make mutual agreement for security); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, (discussing natural liberty subject to natural law); see also E. Vattel, The Law of Nations, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. Il1,
Book I, ch. 1 (G. Fenwick trans. 1916) (1758).
48. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 87, 89, 95-99, at 46-48, 52-53. Cf
T. HOBBES, supra note 41, at 176 (government arises when individuals give up right of governing
to one or assembly, provided all others do the same); id. ch. 18, at 180 (majority will controls); A.
SIDNEY, supra note 41, at 23 (basis of all government is relinquishment by all men of "the Right
which they had of governing themselves"); F. HUTCHESON, supra note 41, at 227 (governments
always started by mutual agreement of people to unite and be governed in common); H. GROTIUS,
supra note 42, at 261 (states formed by "voluntary compact"); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 42,
Bk. I § 2, at 41-43 ("every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty
. . . and obliges himself to conform to [society's] laws"); see also E. VATTEL, supra note 47.
49. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 132, 134, at 68-70. Cf T. HOBBES,
supra note 41, at 245 ("The legislator in all commonwealths is only the sovereign"); F. HUTCHESON, supra note 41, at 227 (governments created by decree by people "of the form or plan of
power, and of the persons to be intrusted with it"); id. at 234-35 (in any government, power to
make laws must be conveyed); J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 41, at 24, 27 (people "confer[] the
supreme authority" on governors; need "decree for settling the form of government"); id. at 30
(sovereignty reduces many will to one "by means of a plurality of suffrages"); H. GROTIUS, supra
note 42, Bk. I, ch.3, § 8, at 104 (people have right to select form of government they wish); S.
PUFENDORF, supra note 42, at 974 (necessary to decide on form of government and give consent
to it).
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Locke argues, is thus no more than an agent of the people: it exercises
only the powers that have been delegated by the people, and it exercises

them then only in a way that the people have authorized."
A government duly appointed by the people and acting within the
bounds of its delegated powers is "legitimate"-that is, it has the right,
and not merely the power, to make laws binding on society. Conversely,
a government that has not been appointed by the people, or that exceeds the scope of its delegated powers-i.e., that exists or acts without

the consent of the governed-is not legitimate. It and its members are
"usurpers," and its laws void.51 The people have the right to resist the

usurping government and to replace it with one of their choice. 52
It is the ideas outlined above to which I refer when I refer to the
Lockean theory of popular sovereignty,5" and to governmental legitimacy based on the consent of the governed.5 4 I characterize Locke's
50. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §g 134-42, at 69-75. Cf. A. SIDNEY,
supra note 41, at 93-94 ("every People for themselves forms and measures the Magistracy, and
magistratical Power; which . . .hath its exercises and extent proportionable to the Command of
those that institute it"); id. at 54, 76; F. HUTCHESON, supra note 41, at 236 (governors hold power
"inthat extent which the original constitution or the fundamental laws have appointed"); id. at
266 (same); J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 41, at 45 (people grant sovereigns only limited authority);
J. MILTON, supra note 47, at 12 (power of rulers derived from people).
51. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 197-198, at 100-01. Cf.F. HUTCHESON, supra note 41, at 270 (usurper exercises "powers not vested in him by the Constitution"); J.
BURLAMAQUI, supra note 41, at 30 (government "ceases to be a legitimate authority" when uses
powers for private rather than people's benefit).
52. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, § 243, at 123. Cf.A. SIDNEY, supra
note 41, at 247-48 (people can depose their rulers); F. HUTCHESON, supra note 41, at 270 (people
have right of resisting usurper); J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 41, at 92 (people may depose tyrants); J. MILTON, supra note 47, at 15 (people have right to choose or change own government).
53. Locke, of course, pursues those basic premises further, in many cases arriving at quite
different conclusions from thinkers whose ideas parallel his. For example, Locke maintains that
the people's delegation of sovereign power is always revocable whenever the people wish to revoke
it. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 149, 222, at 77, 111. Hobbes, on the other
hand, whose ideas on the state of nature and the origins of society and government are very
similar to, and probably to a certain extent inspired, Locke's theory of popular sovereignty, see T.
HOBBES,supra note 41, ch. 13-17, at 141-86, holds that the people's delegation of power to the

monarch is irrevocable. Id. ch. 18.
54. Despite the prominent role played by popular consent in his political philosophy, Locke
is far from clear about just what types of actions or situations constitute the types of consent
necessary to confer governmental legitimacy. On the one hand, he seems to contemplate a type of
deliberately and voluntarily chosen state of mind on the part of one person toward the exercise of
authority by another. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 95-98, 122, 134,
140-141, 149-154, 173, at 52-53, 65, 69, 74-75, 77-80, 90; cf A. SIDNEY, supra note 41, at 84
("'Tis not therefore the bear sufferance of Government when a disgust is declared, nor a silent
submission when the power of opposing is wanted, that can imply an Assent . . .but an explicit
act of approbation, when men have ability and courage to resist or deny"). This is what we might
expect given the general outlines of Locke's epistemology. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERN-
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theory as one of popular sovereignty because, in Locke's scheme, ultiING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (A. Woozley ed. 1964) (1690), Bk. II, ch. 1 [hereinafter
ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING] (ideas formulated by reflection). On

J. LOCKE,
the other

hand, Locke also invokes, particularly with respect to individuals who are not among the original
constituters of a society, a notion of "tacit" consent in which any action taking advantage of the
benefits conferred by a society or its laws is held to constitute consent sufficient to confer legitimacy. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 119-121, at 63-65. This tacit consent
apparently occurs regardless of the state of mind of the actor; indeed, the word "consent" is
misleading when applied in these situations, because what Locke seems to contemplate is a scheme
in which, for reasons quite apart from the actor's mental state, consent or its equivalent may
properly be deemed .to have occurred.
The Lockean notion of consent has been criticized in at least three ways. First, it has been
criticized simply for its vagueness-John Dunn, for example, has called Locke's failure adequately
to explain consent "a damaging lacuna" in his theory. Dunn, Consent in the Political Theory of
John Locke, in LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON LOCKE'S POLITICAL IDEAS 129, 143 (G.
Schochet ed. 1971). Others have noted that Locke and Lockean consent theorists employ the
notion of consent in a way that glosses over great complexities both in the range of subjective
states of mind thatthe term may be taken to embrace, see P. PARTRIDGE, CONSENT AND CONSENsus 32-39 (1971) (essentially "deconstructing" the notion of consent and showing that its possible
meanings range from acquiescence under duress to active permission and explicit approval), and
in the aspects of political obligation to which it may apply. See Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-I, 59 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 990 (1965) (consent relevant to very distinct questions ranging
from the conditions under which resistance to authority is justified, to the questions of who must
be obeyed and why); see also J. PLAMENATZ, CONSENT, FREEDOM AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 125 (2d ed. 1968); Gewirth, Political Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 128-41 (R. Brandt ed. 1962).
Second, Locke's notion of consent has been attacked on the ground that it is simply unreflective of reality-that governments are not and never have been founded on anything like the explicit or even tacit consent seemingly required by Lockean theory. See D. Hume, Of the Original
Contract, Of the First Principlesof Government, and Of the Origin of Government, in DAVID
HUME, MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

307, 311, 356 (H. Aiken ed. 1948).

Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Lockean notion of consent has been criticized as
being not meaningful, or as meaning something quite different from what Lockean consent theorists seem to have intended. Thus Pitkin argues that Locke's theory of consent makes sense only
when applied to "the hypothetical consent imputed to hypothetical, timeless, abstract, rational
men," Pitkin, supra, at 997, and that government is legitimate not when it is founded on actual
consent, but when it is, by its nature and actions, "government which deserves consent." Id. at
999 (emphasis in original). The rejection of the notion of actual, particularized consent in favor of
a conception of hypothetical, particularized consent forms the centerpiece of Rawls' theory of
justice, and allows him to recast the Lockean contract theory of political obligation in purely
moral terms. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Cf. J. BUCHANAN & G.TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962) (using economic analysis to deduce a structure of government
similar to that deduced by Rawls). For further elaboration of the conceptual intertwining of moral
and political obligation under the rubric of "consent," see J. STEINBERG, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND
THE IDEA OF CONSENT: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF POLITICAL OB-

(1978), and sources cited therein.
Others have staked out a more extreme position. Dunn seems to deny that the Lockean notion
of consent has any fixed content even hypothetically, and argues that "the consent of men . . . is
merely the mode in which political authority acquires such legitimacy as it has." Dunn, supra, at
161. Although Dunn views Locke as anchoring the concept of legitimacy ultimately in divine
judgment, id. at 160-61, others view this explanation of consent as inadequate. Casinelli, for exLIGATION
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mate rightful power rests with the people of a society and not with
their government. I characterize Locke's theory as one in which legiti-

macy is based on consent because the government derives its right to
rule exclusively from the people, and because its rule is rightful only
for so long and in such fashion as the people desire. These aspects of
Lockean thought are reflected in the Constitution.
2.

The Constitution and the Lockean
Sovereignty

Theory

of Popular

Any attempt to read the Constitution as embodying a particular
political theory runs the inevitable risk of Procrustean distortion of either the document or the theory. I hope to lessen this risk by making
what i again stress are modest claims. I do not argue that the Constitu-

tion is Lockean in that it incorporates in every detail the entire corpus
of Locke's political writings. Rather, I contend only that one aspect of
the Constitution, albeit a potentially important one, reflects the broad
outlines of Locke's theory of popular sovereignty. Furthermore, I argue

neither that this view of the Constitution is the only correct one, nor
that it is relevant to every constitutional problem. On the contrary, I
argue only that it provides a useful framework for resolving some varieties of constitutional problems, and, in particular, problems concerning
the regulation of federal elections.

With that caveat in mind, let us turn to the evidence.
ample, argues that "a government which is by the consent of the governed cannot be distinguished
from one which is not." Casinelli, The "Consent" of the Governed, 12 W. POL. Q. 391, 405
(1959). He thus advocates a view of governmental legitimacy that is ultimately Weberian. See M.
WEBER, supra note 38, at 31-38 (government is "legitimate" when people believe they must obey
it). Such critics follow a path of analysis that seems to lead to the conclusion that there is no
respectable difference between the political philosophies of Locke and Hume.
Returning to the problem at hand, there is no evidence that the founders were aware of any
of these criticisms of the Lockean idea of consent besides that of Hume, or that Hume's or any
other person's criticism of consent theory caused them the slightest discomfort. Indeed, the fact
that the founders were engaged in the process of defining, establishing and deliberating about
their society and its government suggests strongly that they must have viewed the theory of consent even in its strongest forms as a highly accurate description of the world. Cf. E. MORGAN,
supra note 2, at 174 ("In elections the fiction of popular sovereignty makes its strongest approach
to reality, as actual people ostensibly go about selecting from among themselves the few to whose
government they consent."); Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Outcomes: A
Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 892, 894-95 & nn.17-22 (1984)
[hereinafter Comment, Electoral Outcomes] (discussing framers' belief that elections should and
could express rational decisions of the people). For the founders, the creation of the nation and the
adoption of the Constitution was, in Hamilton's words, the establishment of "good government
from reflection and choice," THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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Textual Evidence
The Declaration of Independence states:

We hold these truths to be self evident; that all men are . . . endowed by their
creator with certain unalienable rights...; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute
new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such55 form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness.

In this passage, the Declaration moves from natural liberty, to the consensual establishment of legitimate government, to the residual right to
change the government. Whatever revisionists may say, these words
clearly and succinctly express a theory of popular sovereignty and of
governmental legitimacy based on popular consent, a theory that is
Lockean as I have defined that term.
Now, the extent to which Locke was in fact Jefferson's source for
these ideas is a subject of dispute among historians. On the one hand,
revisionists have claimed that Locke's influence has been "wildly distorted";5 6 that the Lockean orthodoxy is a "cliche," 57 or is "anachronistic";5" that Locke's theory of the social contract had "little relevance"
before 1776;" 9 and that Jefferson drew in the Declaration on thinkers
who "stood at a conscious and deliberate distance from Locke's political principles." 6 On the other hand, more recent "counterrevisionists"
affirm the role of Locke. Forrest McDonald, for example, has recently
said: "[the view] [t]hat the central argument of the Declaration is
based mainly upon Locke's Second Treatise is indisputable."" This
type of disagreement is partly the result of an ambiguous historical record. To take just one example, shortly after Jefferson drafted the Declaration, Richard Henry Lee accused him of cribbing the Declaration
straight from Locke.62 Jefferson later wrote a denial in which he
claimed to rely on no single author, but nevertheless listed Locke as a
55.
56.
57.

The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 13, at 424.
Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century, in
45-46 (J. Yolton ed. 1969).
D. LUTZ, supra note 19, at 11.
G. WooD, supra note 20, at 283.
G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA, supra note 14, at 239.
F. MCDONALD, supra note 10, at ix.
C. BECKER, supra note 7, at 25.

JOHN LOCKE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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relevant source-yet listed him third, after Aristotle and Cicero.6 3 The

extent to which Jefferson actually relied consciously on Locke is thus
something of a mystery.6
I do not argue, however, that the Declaration is necessarily derived
from Locke, but that it is Lockean in its theory of popular sovereignty
and consent. The Declaration's preamble, and in particular its assertion
that governments derive their "just powers from the consent of the governed," strongly ally the document with such Lockean ideas.
The Constitution can be analyzed similarly. 65 "We the People of
the United States of America," it begins, "do hereby ordain and establish this Constitution."6 6 This language suggests a Lockean theory of
popular sovereignty in at least three ways. First, the language not only
refers immediately and prominently to "the People," an entity of great
significance in Lockean theory,6 7 but also identifies the Constitution as
63.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), reprintedin THE LIFE AND
719 (A. Koch & W. Peden 1st ed. 1944). The full
passage is:
Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular
and previous writing, [the Declaration] was intended to be an expression of the American
mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion.
All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in
conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.
Id. I do not know whether any of the scholars who have attempted to interpret this passage have
noted that the thinkers are listed in alphabetical order; perhaps Jefferson did not intend to list
them in order of influence.
64. See Hamowy, supra note 17, at 512-14 (brief overview of the evidence supporting the
view that Jefferson admired and relied on Locke).
65. As mentioned earlier, Wood and his followers have described the period between the
Revolution and the ratification of the Constitution as one of great change and ferment, thereby
undermining the otherwise natural inference that the Declaration points the way toward or sheds
any useful light on the Constitution. G. WOOD, supra note 20, at 232-36. While Wood's work thus
highlights the dangers of attempting to illuminate the Constitution by reference to the Declaration, the particular danger he emphasized is not present here. To oversimplify somewhat, Wood
viewed the period of 1776 to 1787 as one in which classical republicanism was displaced by Lockcan liberalism. Id. at 519-32. Since Wood would presumably read the Constitution as, if anything,
more Lockean than the Declaration, his thesis at best reinforces, and at worst is irrelevant, to the
following analysis of the Constitution as expressing a Lockean theory of popular sovereignty. See
also Lewis, Adam Smith and the Moral Theory of Liberal Constitutionalism,in THE REVIVAL
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 104 (J. Muller ed. 1988) (Constitution designed to implement Declaration, which was largely condensation of Locke's Second Treatise).
66. U.S. CONST. preamble.
67. Cf.Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 463 (1793) (Wilson, J.) ("[O]ur national
scene opens with the most magnificent object, which the nation could present. 'The people of the
United States' are the first personages introduced.").
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
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speaking in their voice. 68 Second, it refers to the "People of the United
States," thus identifying a distinct society already in existence at the
time of the drafting of the Constitution. Third, the preamble reveals

that it is the people of the United States who are establishing the Constitution, thereby creating a government for themselves. Thus, the preamble suggests (1) a people, (2) comprising a pre-existing society, (3)

establishing
sovereignty.

a

government-the

essence

of

Lockean

popular

The body of the Constitution contains similar clues. The very first

provision of the Constitution, article I, section 1, refers to the "legislative Powers herein granted." But who grants these powers? Since the
only prior text is the preamble, certainly the most logical referent
seems to be the people of the United States: it is they who grant legislative power to the government. The concept of the people of a society
granting legislative power to a government is distinctly Lockean and
amounts to strong evidence of an underlying constitutional theory of
popular sovereignty.
Similarly, articles I, II and III all state that the legislative, execu-

tive and judicial powers are "vested"-again presumably by the people-in the Congress, the President and the courts, respectively. 9 The
explicit designation of Congress as the supreme lawmaker;7 0 the provision for popular election of legislative representatives;71 the require-

ment of ratification by special popular conventions;7" the reservation by
the people of unenumerated rights in the ninth and tenth amendments;
and the general structure of the body of the Constitution itself, which
68. The presence of "the people" as a player on the constitutional stage is not by itself
inconsistent with classical thought; the people played a role in classical political theory as well as
in Locke's. E.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 29, at 151-57 (varieties of democracy). If the Constitution
were a classical republican document, however, it seems unlikely that the people would speak as
the makers of fundamental law as they do in the preamble. In classical thought, laws were frequently viewed as having an independent existence distinct from the people who lived under .them
rather than owing their existence to the people. See, e.g., PLATO, Crito, in THE DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 27, 36-41 (1986). Moreover, where humans were involved in the creation of law, the classical model seems to be more one of the heroic lawgiver, on the model of a Solon or a Draco, than
the one of popular creation of laws for society suggested by the Constitution. See, e.g., Plutarch,
Solon, in THE RISE AND FALL OF ATHENS 43 (1960); THE FEDERALIST, No. 38, at 231-32 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES, Bk. 3, ch. 1, at 387
(B. Crick ed. 1970) (1531) (renewal of society accomplished either by Virtuous men, or by institutions, which must themselves be brought to life by virtuous men).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1.
70. Id., art. VI.
71.
72.

Id., art. 1, § 2.
Id., art. VII.
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purports to dictate both the form of government and the scope of powers granted, all point strongly to a Lockean notion of popular sovereignty based on consent of the governed.
b.

HistoricalEvidence

The historical record brims with evidence that the framers embraced an essentially Lockean theory of popular sovereignty. A brief
review of the highlights will suffice here, since much of this evidence
has been set out elsewhere in detail. 73 For example, there is a "state of
nature," said Madison7-or "savage State," as both he and
Gouverneur Morris also termed it 7 5-in which insecurity impels individuals to establish government. 76 As a result, said James Wilson, government is "derived from the people." 77 It follows, according to Hamilton, that "[tihe fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid
basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national
power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of
all legitimate authority. 7' 8 Others echoed this aquatic imagery. According to Madison, "the people are the only legitimate fountain of
power."' 79 The people, said Wilson, are "the fountain of government."80
"All authority," remarked Charles Pinckney, "flows from and returns
at stated periods to, the people."8 " In these circumstances, according to
Oliver Ellsworth, "all the power government now has is a grant from
73. E.g., G. WOOD, supra note 20, at 344-89, 543-47, 593-615; Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429-66 (1987).
74. THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also J.
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 153 (A. Koch ed. 1966)
[hereinafter MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES] (remarks of Luther Martin and Alexander Hamilton,
June 19, 1787 both referring to state of nature).
75. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 10 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 206, 212 (A. Rutland ed. 1977); MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra
note 74, at 244 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris, July 5, 1787).
76. THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 324-325 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
77. MADISON. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 74, at 189; see also THE FEDERALIST, No. 37,
at 227 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("all power should be derived from the people"); id.
No. 9, at 72 (A. Hamilton) (people represented by "deputies"); id. No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton)
(same).
78. THE FEDERALIST, No. 22, at 152 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
79. THE FEDERALIST, No. 49, at 313 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 74, at 564 (remarks of James Madison, Aug. 31, 1787)
("The people were in fact, the fountain of all power.").
80. G. WOOD, supra note 20, at 535; accord MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 74,
at 82 (government "ought to flow from the people at large").
81. G. WOOD, supra note 20, at 596.
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the people." 8' 2 The government, said John Jay, exercises "no rights but
such as the people commit to them."8 " Madison described a republic as
characterized by "the delegation of the government . . . to a small
number of citizens," 8" making government officials merely "agents and
trustees of the people." 8 Even when they have delegated governmental
power to their agents, said Wilson, in the United States, the people
retain supreme power.8 6
It would be possible to give many more examples. Indeed, it is
undoubtedly the prevalence of such expressions that led Carl Becker to
call the philosophy of natural rights a "commonplace" in the late eighteenth century, and Locke's works "a kind of political gospel."'8 7 Even
Gordon Wood has written that it was "axiomatic by 1776 'that the
only moral foundation of government is, the consent of the people.' "88
c.

Judicial Interpretation

Several decisions of the Supreme Court lend further support to the
notion that the Constitution can be seen as embodying a Lockean theory of popular sovereignty. Some of the earliest decisions make this
point quite explicitly. In Chisolm v. Georgia,8 9 the Court's first real
constitutional case, the Court was called upon to decide whether a state
could be sued by a citizen of another state. Several of the justices discussed the nature of governmental sovereignty at some length."0 Justice
Iredell noted that a state "derives its authority from . . . [t]he voluntary and deliberate choice of the people." 9 1 Justice Wilson, a signer of
the Declaration and a delegate to the constitutional convention, wrote a
lengthy opinion in which he touched upon the "original sovereign[ty]"
82. Id. at 542.
83. Id. at 546.
84. THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 82 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also id., No.
2, at 37 (J. Jay) (people cede some natural rights to government "in order to vest it with requisite
powers").
85. THE FEDERALIST, No. 46, at 294 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also id., No.
78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (government is agent of the people).
86. G. WOOD, supra note 20, at 599.
87. C. BECKER, supra note 7, at 24, 27.
88. G. WOOD, supra note 20, at 182; see also T. PANGLE, supra note 10, at 176 (by late
eighteenth century there was "a largely Lockean consensus on political first principles"); C. RosSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REVOLUTION (1953) (describing political thought of American
revolutionaries).
89. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
90. There was no opinion of the Court; each Justice delivered his own opinion.
91. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 448 (1793).
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of free men. 2 Justice Wilson defined a republican government as one
in which "the supreme power resides in the body of the people," 9 and
stated that just laws "must be founded on the consent of those whose
obedience they require." 94 Chief Justice Jay, one of the authors of The
Federalist,gave a detailed and essentially Lockean explanation of the
Constitution, calling it "a compact made by the people of the United
States, to govern themselves. ' 95 He also observed that "sovereignty,"
by which he meant "the right to govern," in the United States "rests
with the people" rather than "the Prince"; 96 that is, with the people
rather than the government.
Justice Iredell expressed similar sentiments in Penhallow v. Doane.97 And Justice Paterson, a former delegate to the constitutional
convention, weighed in soon after with a discussion of his own delivered
while sitting on circuit in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance:"The constitution," he said, "is the work or will of the people themselves, in their
original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity."98 Chief Justice John Marshall also expressed a typically Lockean theory of popular sovereignty
in McCulloch v. Maryland:99 "The government of the Union, then,
• . . is emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form and
in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them,
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit."' 10 0
Since then, the Court has expressed, fairly consistently ideas of popular
sovereignty that are basically Lockean, referring explicitly to popular
sovereignty or consent of the governed as the basis of state and national
government on many occasions. For example, in a 1976 case the Court
referred to the United States as "a republic where the people are sovereign." ' ' In a 1979 case, the Court said that the government of each
state "governs only with the consent of the governed.' 0 2
92. Id. at 456.
93. Id. at 457.
94. Id. at 458. See also id. at 465 ("the people of the United States intended to form
themselves into a nation . . . [and) instituted, for such purposes, a national Government").
95. Id. at 471.
96. Id. at 472.
97. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 54, 93 (1795).
98. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (1795).
99. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
100. Id. at 404-05.
101. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam).
102. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979). See also Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa,
439 U.S. 60, 70 (1978); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253, 257 (1967); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 651 (1948); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
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The Lockeanism of the Constitution
The Lockean theory of popular sovereignty deals with some of the

most fundamental issues in political theory, including the nature of sovereignty, the origins of government, and the sources of governmental
legitimacy and authority. Lockean theory also seems to have concrete
implications for fundamental issues such as the nature of political tyr-

anny, and the meaning of, and reasons for, obedience to law. The Lockean idea of popular sovereignty may also have far more attenuated implications, however, for such other significant issues as the nature of
citizenship, the role of or need for civic virtue, the nature of the common good, and the proper objects of government. Clearly there is some
play in the joints: the theory of popular sovereignty is broad enough to
embrace, for example, both Hobbesian and Lockean views of human

nature.5 0
U.S. 624, 641 (1943); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935); Adams v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 43 (1907); McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Texas v. White,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 721 (1868). There are also a number of cases in the first amendment area
that advance to varying degrees a theory of the first amendment as protecting the institution of
popular self-government. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communication
Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
It is possible to argue that the more recent of these citations do not really support the proposition that the Court has continued to view the Constitution as embodying a Lockean theory of
popular sovereignty-that the Court meant something different when it used the language of popular sovereignty in 1880 or 1980 from what it meant in 1795. To a certain extent, there is indeed
an element of lip-service in the Court's invocation of popular sovereignty in the later cases. While
it is impossible here to deal fully with this question, I would argue in brief that the Court's view of
the fundamental nature of the Constitution has remained relatively constant over the centuries, as
has the view of American society in general. See M. KAMMEN. A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF
ITSELF 381 (1986) ("the fundamental character of American constitutionalism [has] change[d] so
little when most other aspects of national life have significantly altered"). First, the Court still
seems to view itself as engaged in the enterprise of holding the people's agents to the terms of the
people's instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) (Court does not
overrule people's representatives, it enforces Constitution as supreme law "ordained and established by the people"); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 512 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(Court has "unflagging duty to strike down official activity that exceeds the confines of the Constitution"). Second, the Court has continued to invoke popular sovereignty in situations that do not
seem out of place or inconsistent with the ways in which we might have expected the concept to be
invoked in the eighteenth century. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (striking down
law permitting government to strip citizens of citizenship, a situation directly implicating the
power of society to determine its membership).
103. Thus, while both Hobbes and Locke viewed the origins of government as based, at
least initially, on consent, see supra notes 47-49, Hobbes characterized the state of nature as a
state of perpetual war of all against all, T. HOBBES, supra note 41, at 141-45, whereas Locke
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To some extent, the Constitution, to say nothing of the thought of
the framers, can accommodate a mixture of Lockean and republican
ideas. Indeed, despite the vagueness of the participants, it is possible to
view the current debate over the influence of republicanism as taking
for granted that the Constitution's roots in popular sovereignty are
Lockean. This is especially so given recent clarifications by several
leading exponents of republicanism, who argue that criticisms of their
work have exaggerated the scope of the claims they intended to make
on behalf of the republicanism of the founding. 104 In any event, regardless of the scope of actual or potential claims on behalf of republicanism, the textual and historical evidence, supplemented by judicial interpretations, reveals a Constitution that reflects an essentially Lockean
theory of popular sovereignty under which governmental legitimacy
rests on the consent of the governed. This theory is the starting point
for the analysis that follows.
II.

ELECTIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY

The Lockean constitutional requirement making consent a condition of governmental legitimacy has important implications for the conduct of elections under the Constitution. In a sense, this seems intuitive: there is something consensual about the popular election of'a
candidate for public office. The electoral institution turns out to be
somewhat more complex than this intuitive link reveals; nevertheless, as
illustrated in this section, elections and governmental legitimacy are intimately related. Furthermore, because election laws and procedures
can so importantly influence election results, they too can have a great
impact on governmental legitimacy. This, I will argue, suggests a potential method of constitutional analysis for election laws and
regulations.
A.

The Multiple Meanings of "Election" In Lockean Theory

An analysis of the relation between governmental legitimacy and
elections is complicated by the fact that the term "election" does triple
duty in the constitutional realm of popular sovereignty. First, the term
at times refers to the people's sovereign act of choosing agents to run
characterized it as a more peaceful condition in which people endeavor to preserve each other and
punish transgressors fairly. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 6-8, at 9-10.
104. See, e.g., Pocock, Gog and Magog, supra note 31, at 336-46 (1987); see also Banning,
supra note 29.
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the government. Second, the term sometimes refers to the rule of decision-for example, majority rule-which by agreement governs the
making of the sovereign choice. Third, the term also refers to the system of voting by which the people's sovereign decisions are revealed to
themselves and to their agents. Before attempting to define the relation
of elections to legitimacy, it is necessary to untangle these different
meanings.
1. The Election as a Specialized Act of Sovereign Choice
According to the Lockean theory of popular sovereignty, a government is merely the agent of the people of a society who have decided,
for their own benefit, to create the government. To transform this abstract principle into practice, however, requires that important decisions be made, as the men who met in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft the
Constitution discovered. At a minimum, for instance, a form of government must be chosen.'1 5 Furthermore, a government cannot operate on
paper; it must be populated with flesh-and-blood officials to do its work.
The people must therefore appoint specific individuals to serve as their
governmental agents. The people's decision to create a government in
the form of a republic-a decision, incidentally, by no means compelled
6
by the theory of popular sovereignty°"-generally
entails a decision to
10 7
appoint governmental agents through periodic elections.
From the perspective of the Lockean theory of popular sovereignty, there are at least two different ways to view an election under a
republican form of government. The first is to conceive of the election
as a sovereign act of the people, essentially unconfined and uncontrolla105. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, § 89, at 47-48 (legislative
power is identical with society itself); id. § 132, at 68-69 (form of government determined by
location of legislative power); id. § 134, at 69-70 (appointment of legislative). See supra note 49.
106. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, § 132, at 68-69 (people can create
government in form that seems best to them); cf. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S.
1776) (people may "institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its power in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness"). There is a'distinct tendency among constitutional scholars to confuse popular sovereignty with democracy. See A. BICKEL, supra note 38; cf.P.PARTRIDGE, supra note 54, at 23-24
(idea of consent has survived as element of democratic theory, which tends to view consent as
possible only in what we think of as democratic regimes). However, the two are not the same; one
can have popular sovereignty under a monarchical form of government as much as under a direct
democracy. The point of popular sovereignty is to let the people choose what form of government
to establish.
107. This is the classic Madisonian definition of a republic. THE FEDERALIST, No. 39, at 82
(J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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ble because taken in their sovereign capacity. In other words, an election is an exercise of the people's sovereign power to choose governmental agents, and because sovereignty is by definition complete and
essentially absolute,"0 8 a sovereign act is unlimited by any rightful
power other than the sovereign wishes of the people themselves. This
view has a certain intuitive appeal: the appointment of governmental
agents is certainly one of the essential acts of a sovereign people; it
assures that the government exists, at least at its inception, with the
consent of the people. The initial consent exists because it is presumably impossible-indeed, it is a contradiction in terms-for the people to
appoint an agent to whose rule they do not consent. Thus, elections are
truly the means by which consent, and therefore governmental legitimacy, is conferred.
An-alternative view conceives of elections as something much more
limited. This view emphasizes that the people have not consented
merely to be ruled by whomever they happen to appoint; on the contrary, they have consented to be ruled by such a person only within the
very defined framework of the particular republican government they
have chosen to erect. In this view, the people's election of a particular
person to exercise governmental powers manifests only the tiniest portion, if any portion at all, of what the Lockean theory would term their
consent. The vast bulk of their consent is directed to the form of government, the division and enumeration of its powers, and even the electoral institution itself, which is nothing more than the product of the
prior agreement that outlined the form and mechanisms of the government.' 09 To give an example, the people's election of George Bush in
1988 does not mean they have consented to be ruled by Mr. Bush. It
means only that, having previously consented to be ruled by a government divided into three branches, of which the executive branch exercises only certain very limited and clearly defined powers, they further
agree that George Bush may occupy a particular, highly circumscribed
office within this branch for a period of no more than four years.
This limited view is all the more appealing when, as in the United
States, the constitution is written, and includes a provision for periodic
108. To natural law theorists, no sovereign power has the authority to violate natural law;
thus, the sovereignty of the people must be understood as absolute within the confines of natural
law. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, § 23, at 17. "
109. See P. PARTRIDGE, supra note 54, at 51 (alluding to distinction between consent to
form of government and consent to particular government or to its policies); Pitkin, supra note 54,
at 42.
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elections. 110 If there is Lockean consent to be found in this system, is it
not to be found in the creation of the constitution itself? The constitutional requirement of elections by the people is thus merely the product
of this prior sovereign act of consent, and the elections themselves are

not sovereign acts at all. Rather, an election is a routine governmental
act in which the people function essentially as an organ of government
rather than as sovereigns.111 Indeed, the people have gone so far as to
-permit their electoral role to be regulated by law," 2 something potentially incompatible with the taking of actions in their sovereign capacity. Thus, although the election may be important, it has no more significance in the Lockean sense than does the passage of a law by
Congress, a presidential appointment to an agency, a decision by a fed3
eral court, or any other routine act of constitutional governance.'

For Locke and for the framers, the true nature of elections in a
republican government seems to lie between these two extremes. Under

the Constitution, an election is considered an act of the people in their
sovereign capacity because it involves the appointment of agents and

the expression of consent. Both of these factors play an integral role in
the operation of popular sovereignty: they are essential to and inseparable from the concept of popular self-rule," 4 and are vital to the legiti110. The analysis is the same, however, even without a written constitution because there is
still prior agreement to create a government in which periodic elections are held, whether this
aspect of the agreement is written or not. At least, this is the British view.
11.
Cf. H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 41 (1967) (in view of Organschaft
theorists, "[e]ven the voter may be seen as an organ of the state").
112. •E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; see J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40,
§ 198, at 101 (appointment of agents should be governed by law).
113. This could be the ultimate view of some people who justify failing to vote on the
ground that "it doesn't matter who wins." To these people, the important thing may be the form
of the government and the activities and liberties it protects. Who occupies any particular office
may thus be of little consequence so long as the overall structure of the government is satisfactory.
114. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 141, 198, at 74-75, 101. Alternatively, one might say that the nature of most forms of Lockean popular sovereignty makes it
theoretically impossible for the people to delegate governmental power to themselves. In Lockean
theory, the government bears a relation to the people much like that of an agent to his principal.
See supra note 50; see also THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). To say that the people act at an election like a mere organ of government is to make the
somewhat anomalous claim that a principal can act as his own agent. While a principal certainly
has the power to behave in any given situation as though he were his own agent, he does so only
through the exercise of voluntary self-restraint, retaining in spite of himself the ability to exercise
all powers he has as a principal at any time. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 737 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (Congress cannot delegate legislative power to itself or its components).
The one situation in which such an arrangement might make sense would be in a pure democracy, where the people participate directly in governance. In that situation, the people might
well choose as an act of voluntary self-restraint for their own safety and convenience to submit to
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macy of the government.11 5 The holding of an election thus implements
the decision of the people to assure that their representatives "should

have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the
rules-i.e., law-in their exercise of governmental power even though, in theory, they could as a
group change or discard the rules at any time. See J.PLAMENATZ, supra note 54, at 19 (in pure
democracy the people do not consent to the exercise of legislative power because a person cannot
"consent" to his own actions). This seems to be the view taken by those states in which limited
direct democracy in the form of initiatives and referenda exists: the people as lawmakers are
understood to make those laws subject to the state constitution, and the passage of a referendum
that conflicts with the constitution is not taken as a subsequent and superseding sovereign act. See
Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1508 (1990).
The framers, however, were most emphatic that the United States is a republic, not a democracy, in which the people exercise only sovereign power, and governmental power is exercised
solely by their representatives. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 63, at 387 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (federal government characterized by "the total exclusion of the people in their collective
capacity, from any share in [the government]") (emphasis in original). Because the whole point of
a republic is to.create a government in which the people are represented rather than personally
present, see id. at 386-87, there would be no good reason for the people to create a republic where
the people's representatives are elected by the people acting in any capacity other than their sovereign one. That type of self-restraint would be a burden without any commensurate benefit.
Note that this analysis would not apply in situations where the people have deliberately restricted the right to participate in electoral decisions to a subset of the larger body of the people-for example, the wise, or the old, or the rich. In such cases, the people have really designated
a subgroup of the people as an agent of all, and the designated individuals vote not as sovereigns,
but as agents bound to do the will of all the people. Such a system, when implemented fairly and
by consent, amounts to a properly Lockean system of "virtual representation." See, e.g., E. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 240-45 (general discussion of virtual representation). Of course, in most
cases where popular authority for virtual representation has been claimed, it has doubtless been
imposed by a despotic, usurping subgroup of the people, and has lacked the full measure of popular consent necessary to make such a government legitimate.
115. This is just as true when the election is indirect, see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl.I &
art. II, § 1 (election of Senate and President), as when the election is direct. Id., art. I, § 2, cl.I
(election of House). According to Locke, government itself, legitimate or otherwise, cannot by
definition exist unless there is a lawmaker. See supra note 49; see also J. LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE, supra note 40, § 198, at 101. In order for the people of a society to create a government at all, it is necessary for them either to select a lawmaker directly, or to create some method
or procedure for the selection and identification of the lawmaker. Direct selection by the people
can occur in at least two ways: the people can name the lawmaker at the time they create the
government, or they can institute a process in which they periodically assemble to directly select
the lawmaker. But the people can also set up indirect systems for selecting the lawmaker. In the
case of the original plan for senatorial elections, for instance, the people had some role in the
selection, but did not make the ultimate choice. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.1. Or, the people can
select the lawmaker even more indirectly by instituting at the time'they create the government a
procedure, even a self-executing procedure, for the identification of the lawmaker in which the
people play no role beyond the initial selection of the method to be used. For example, the people
can create a hereditary monarchy under which the identification of the lawmaker is determined by
accidents of birth and in which process the people play no role other than the initial one of having
selected a hereditary monarchy and having identified the initial monarch. But no matter what
method the people choose, the government is legitimate only when there is not only a lawmaker,
but one selected by or in accordance with a method prescribed by the people.
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people."1'16 An election, however, is not an act of unlimited sovereignty
because, by prior agreement, the people have decided not to reexamine
at election time any aspect of the government they have created for
themselves except the identity of individual office holders. In other
words, at election time the agenda is very different from and much
more limited than it is at constitution-making or amendment time. The
form of government, for example, is not up for grabs, nor are the duration of an office holder's term or the powers he may exercise during
that term. Those items, the people have previously agreed, will be considered at other times and in other ways. 117 Thus, a presidential candi116. THE FEDERALIST, No. 52, at 327 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
117. Thus, Article V of the Constitution embodies a sovereign decision by the people of the
United States to deal with any and all changes to the fundamental agreement concerning the form
of the government-i.e., constitutional amendments-at a particular time and under specified procedures. U.S. CONST. art. V. See Casinelli, supra note 54, at 395 ("[lt cannot be assumed that
[the voters] consider elections as opportunities to approve or disapprove of the fundamental principles of a representative government."). This seems to be the position that Bruce Ackerman refers
to critically as "leveling democracy" in arguing that the people can amend the Constitution
outside the procedural framework of Article V. Ackerman, The Storrs Lecture: Discovering the
Constitution,93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1035-37 (1984). From the perspective of Lockean popular sovereignty, Ackerman's conclusions are obviously sound: the people can do what they want, when they
want; they are as free to break self-imposed procedural rules as they are to make them. They can
amend or abandon the Constitution, in whole or in part, at any time, with or without notice.
What is troubling about Ackerman's position, though, is that he argues not merely that the
people can amend the Constitution without resort to Article V, but that they in fact did so during
the New Deal era through the medium of ordinary electoral choices. Id. at 1055-56. Thus, Ackerman argues that the United States presently operates under a Constitution that is partly written
and partly unwritten. Again, there is no theoretical impediment to such an arrangement; Locke,
after all, wrote to defend the English Constitution, which has never been reduced to writing.
Nevertheless, I find Ackerman's theory implausible for several reasons.
First, the people have successfully employed the procedures set out in Article V on twenty-six
occasions, both before and after the New Deal. They seem to have no reason to abandon a process
that seems to be working well enough. Second, the people, at least according to Madison, are
incapable of moving spontaneously; they require options to be presented to them. The New Dealers did not present this option to the people when they ran for office: although candidates may
have held themselves out as standing for change, they did not explicitly present those changes as
ones of constitutional dimension. Third, it seems odd that the people would have chosen to work
within the constitutional system of elections for constitutionally established offices if what they
really wanted to do was change the Constitution-to act simultaneously "out-of-doors" and "indoors," to paraphrase Gordon Wood's terminology. See G. WOOD, supra note 20, at 319-28. But
fourth and most importantly, Ackerman would have the people abandon a long-standing, deliberate tradition of written constitutions, with all the certainty and stability they bring, in favor of the
uncertainty and instability associated with a partly written constitution under which it is impossible to pin down with certainty the "text" of the unwritten provisions, and therefore next to impossible to resolve constitutional disputes. Indeed, Americans might be inclined to doubt whether an
unwritten constitution is a constitution in any meaningful sense, at least from the perspective of
the American constitutional tradition. I would not infer without much better evidence that the
people have taken such a radical step. See Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitu-
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date whose platform includes a promise to stay in office for six years
may win the election, but should consider himself only at his great peril
to be empowered to postpone the next constitutionally scheduled
election.
In a republican government, then, one meaning of the term "election" refers to a limited or specialized act of sovereign choice designating a particular individual to exercise specific governmental powers as
the people's agent. An important element of the people's consent accompanies such a designation: the people consent to be ruled under a
government they have created and shaped, and by a particular person
they have appointed. When elected, this person becomes, as Locke put
it, "the person the people have consented to.'' 118
2.

The Election as a Social Rule of Decision

A second, related meaning of the term "election" is the notion of
an election as a rule of decision for making the sovereign choice of
whom to appoint as agent of the people. Under the Lockean theory of
popular sovereignty, as we have seen, free and autonomous individuals
band together voluntarily into civil society, exchanging their right to
rule themselves for the security and advantages associated with organized society. In so doing, they agree to be ruled by the society itself. A
society, however, cannot rule, or even act, and therefore cannot fulfill
the promise of safety and advantage to its members, unless it provides
for itself some sort of rule of decision such that each society member
regards the decisions so reached to be binding on himself and all
others. A rule requiring unanimity would be impractical."' Therefore,
for the most part, the rule of decision said by natural law theorists to
apply to collective decisions of a society is majority rule.12
In order to implement majority rule, it is of course necessary to
count heads. In the specific case of appointing an agent-i.e., an election-this rule of decision generally requires that the person whom a
majority of society's members wish to appoint shall be named the agent
of the entire society. The practical necessity of head-counting in this
situation introduces a computational element into the process of collection Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1048 n.13 (1988) (arguing that constitutional
amendment requires a text).
118. J.LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, § 198, at 101.
119. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 97-99, at 52-53.
120. Id. The people, however, can also agree to be governed by supermajorities. See id.
§ 99, at 53.
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tive self-rule. Indeed, the computational aspect of implementing majority rule greatly complicates a seemingly simple process. In order to accomplish even the most basic acts of self-rule, a society must identify
its members; canvass them to learn their opinions; record their preferences; and tote up the results. The computational aspect of implementing the social rule of decision thus entails the possibility of error. I shall
call this possibility of error "electoral inaccuracy": the possibility that
the declared winner of the election is not in fact the one preferred by a
majority of voters. I shall return shortly to this idea.
3.

The Election as a System for Discovering PopularDecisions

The third way in which the term "election" is frequently used is to
refer to the system of campaigning, balloting, and voting that reveals
the preferences of the people.12 1 The previously mentioned rule of decision can then be applied in order to determine who shall be appointed
the people's agent. Like majority rule itself, many aspects of this type
of election are dictated by practical necessity.
In a small society, the people may have the ability to meet in a
group, discuss issues among themselves, and decide immediately how to
act.' 2 2 In a large society, this is impossible; the people's sheer numbers
make it, in Madison's words, "impossible for the people spontaneously
and universally to move in concert towards their object." 2 To rule
121. This article does not address the problems associated with denying the right to vote to
individuals who are in other ways viewed or ought to be viewed as members of society and thus
entitled under the theory of popular sovereignty to a voice in government. There can be no question that one of the most unfortunate divergences between the American theory and practice of
popular sovereignty has been the direct disenfranchisement of blacks, women and, periodically,
the impecunious. Locke would view this disenfranchisement as political enslavement. See J.
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 22-24, 169-243, at 17-18, 88-124. See Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1989); see
also Amar, supra note 117, at 1075 n.117. This article focuses not on the problems associated
with identifying society's members, but on the problems associated with consulting through elections those individuals whom society has designated as its members. For a recent discussion of the
distribution of the franchise itself, see Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989); Levinson, Suffrage and
Community: Who Should Vote?, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 545 (1989).
122. The Lockean theory of popular sovereignty regards "the people" as a concrete entity
capable of at least some types of actions and thoughts. For a very different view, see E. MORGAN,
supra note 2 (arguing that "the people" is a fiction that sustains government authority, much as
the divine right of kings was a fiction which was eclipsed for historical reasons by the fiction of
popular sovereignty). See also Pocock, Gog and Magog, supra note 31, at 337 (American "foundational myth" of covenant).
123. THE FEDERALIST, No. 40, at 253 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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themselves effectively, the people are forced both to appoint representatives to act for them, 2 4 and, frequently, to rely on those representatives
to propose ideas for the people's assent or rejection."'
If the people's great number makes them immobile, it also makes
them inarticulate: they are too numerous to formulate a single opinion,
too numerous, perhaps, even to hold one.'12 Even when a majority of
the people holds an opinion which society and its agents wish to consult, it must be extraordinarily difficult for the majority to communicate its wishes. Likewise, it must be difficult for the people and their
agents to recognize the opinions so expressed as that of the majority.
Consequently, a society must devise some method, however imperfect,
for attempting to discover the wishes of a majority of its members. The
nature of the people suggests three aspects essential to such a system.
First, because the people are immobile, they cannot on their own find
and mutually agree upon a single person to appoint as their agent; instead, candidates must be brought before the people for their choice.
Second, because the people are inarticulate, they cannot easily voice
their preferences. Their choice must be recorded by some means, such
as a vote by ballot. Third, the ballots must be collected, and the previously agreed upon rule of decision must be applied to determine whom
the people have chosen.
Ironically, this electoral method, certainly the most common now
in use, may well further reduce the articulateness of the people. Under
this voting system, the people frequently are reduced to a collective
vocabulary that is almost infantile in its simplicity; indeed, it often consists of only two words: yes or no, Line A or Line B, Republican or
Democrat. And even when the people speak clearly enough in this limited way, shouting an answer to some binary question put before them,
their meaning remains cloudy in other respects. Did they even understand the question? Did they understand how to record their individual
124. E.g., B. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS Bk. II, ch.2, [6], at 107 (D.
Carrithers ed. 1977) (1748) ("The people . . . ought to do of themselves whatever conveniently
they can; and what they cannot well do, they must commit to the management of ministers."); see
also MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 74, at 74 (remarks of James Wilson, June 6, 1787)
("Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act
collectively.").
125. THE FEDERALIST, No. 40, at 253-54 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
126. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 78 (J.- Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("As long as
the reason of man continues fallible . . . different opinions will be formed."); J. LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, § 98, at 53 ("[T]he variety of Opinions, and contrariety of
Interests, which unavoidably happen in all Collections of Men ....
.
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responses? Why did they vote the way they did? Did they approve of
all the many planks in the platform of a successful candidate? Was it
the candidate's positions or character that they found most appealing?
Attempts to answer questions like these have spawned whole branches
of political science devoted to studying the electorate, not to mention a
vigorous and profitable political polling industry.
B.

The Need for Electoral Accuracy

The foregoing discussion shows what I think ought to be intuitive:
that there is a strong and direct link between elections and the legitimacy of a republican government. First, an election is a specialized
sovereign act of choice by the people; it is the means by which the
people exercise their sovereign right to choose the agents who will wield
governmental power. The election is also therefore the means by which
the people express their consent to a particular government run by particular individuals. Second, an election in a republic implements the
rule of decision by which the people have agreed to make their sovereign choice of agents. Third, an election is a system for obtaining data
about the wishes of the people, data to which the rule of decision is
applied in order to determine whom the people have actually appointed
as their agent.
Elections also affect governmental legitimacy in corresponding
ways. Because the people alone have the right to appoint agents in a
republic, only a government consisting of individuals to whom the people have consented can be legitimate. Furthermore, only candidates selected by application of the agreed upon rules of decision to the respective individual choices of the people can legitimately take office.
Finally, since only the people's actual choice can legitimately claim the
reins of government, the people must provide themselves with the best
possible data from which to determine their own choices. A defect at
any point in this chain can, according to the Lockean theory of popular
sovereignty, undermine the legitimacy of both the apparent winner of
an election and the government in which he or she serves. A discrepancy in the process thus has the potential to transform an apparently
successful candidate into a usurper whose actions are invalid and whose
1217
laws need not be obeyed-certainly a dire result.
127. One need not view an election as an act of sovereign choice in order to reach the same
conclusion. Even if an election is only a routine act of constitutional governance, see supra text
accompanying notes 109-13, and the misidentification of the people's governmental agent is
merely an unconstitutional government action, it is nevertheless an unconstitutional action that
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The principal means by which such discrepancies can creep into
the process is through the choice of election procedures and the en-

forcement of elections laws.
C.

The Influence of Electoral Procedures on Electoral Outcomes

Elections have been conducted in this country in the same way for
so long that it is difficult to conceive of their being conducted in any
other way, much less to view some other way as equally "good" or

"proper." Yet we must put aside our preconceptions for a moment in

order to appreciate the impact that electoral procedures can have on
electoral outcomes. Procedure, as Justice Frankfurter once observed,
"goes to the very substance of law."' 12 8 This is as true for elections as

for any other area of law: the procedural scheme under which candidates run for office and voters elect them can affect decisively who wins
the election. As Madison himself put it at the constitutional convention
during a debate concerning the power to regulate elections to Congress:
"the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode."' 2 9
An example will help to clarify this proposition. In the 1984 congressional election in Indiana's fifth election district, the vote was so
close that several recounts were ordered under state and, later, federal
control. Different counts produced different winners. Finally, a House
panel conducted a final recount which resulted in a four-vote victory

for the Democratic candidate.'

0

Obviously, the people of the fifth dis-

poses a far greater threat to legitimacy than other such acts. This is because the misidentification
of the agent can rob all the agent's actions of the people's consent, whereas the exceeding of
constitutional bounds by a particular act of a properly identified agent deprives only that single
act of the people's consent. It is far less likely that the people will have no tolerance for the latter
than for the former. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text; see also J. BURLAMAQUI,
supra note 41, at 93 ("If, for the smallest faults, the people had a'right to resist or depose their
sovereign, no prince could maintain his authority, and the community would be continually dis"); The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[A]II experience hath
tracted ....
shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves
by abolishing the forms, to which they are accustomed.").
128. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 133 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Accord Brown v.
Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949) (impossible to "lay[] down a precise rule to
distinguish 'substance' from 'procedure' ").
129. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 74, at 423 (remarks of James Madison,
Aug. 9, 1787).
130. See Roberts, House Democrats Seat Indianan, and the Republicans Walk Out, N.Y.
Times, May 2, 1985, at Al, col. 1. Extremely close elections are by no means uncommon in this
country. For example, the 1974 North Dakota senate race was decided by a margin of only 186
votes out of 235,661 cast. McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1166 n.13 (8th Cir. 1980).
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trict were very evenly divided about whom they wished to appoint to
represent them in Congress.
It is not difficult to imagine how even the slightest change in electoral procedures could have changed the outcome of this election. Suppose the election had been held on Sunday morning from 8:00 a.m.
until noon instead of all day Tuesday. It is not extravagant to suppose
that four people in Indiana's fifth district might have been unable to go
to the polls because their religious beliefs compelled them to be in
church, and that the outcome of the election might then have been different. Similarly, if the election had been held on Saturday, no Orthodox Jews would have been permitted by their religion to go to the polls,
again potentially influencing the outcome.
Of course, the Tuesday voting day did not present any such religious obstacles, but suppose that the polls had been open on Wednesday as well as on Tuesday. Is it not possible that four people who failed
to vote on Tuesday because they simply, could not get away from the
office, or because they suddenly became ill, or because their cars broke
down unexpectedly, would have been able to make it to the polls on
Wednesday? Might the result then have been different? And what
might have been the result had the polls stayed open all week?
Tinkering with the day on which an election is held may seem like
an extreme way to make a point. It is not. Suppose the state of Indiana
had forbidden women to vote, as it did until 1921,11s or had forbidden
blacks to vote, as it did until 188 1.132 Suppose Indiana had a property
qualification for voting eligibility, as Connecticut had until 1845,11a or
had imposed a poll tax, as Virginia did until 1966.3 Suppose it had
required a literacy test, as numerous states did until 1965.135 Or suppose that, rather than excluding people from the vote, Indiana had a
law requiring eligible citizens to vote, as was the case in eighteenthcentury Georgia 1 6 and is now the case in Austria, Switzerland, and
131. IND. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (1921).
132. IND. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1881).
133. CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1818), as amended by art. VIII (1845).
134. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
135. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965)
(banning denial of right to vote for failure to comply with any test); H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2437, 2444-47.
136. GA. CONST. art. XII (1777). Virginia also had a compulsory voting law in the late
eighteenth century. See J. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 293-294 (1966).
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several other countries.1 37 Any of these changes could have produced a
different outcome in the election results.
Again, these are fairly obvious examples because they affect who
is actually eligible to cast votes. It is highly likely that rules determining who is eligible to vote will affect election results, at least if we
assume that a diversity of opinion exists among different groups in the
general population. Yet more subtle procedural variations can have just
as strong an effect on electoral outcomes. An example from ancient
Rome makes this point vividly and also illustrates that the problem of
procedural influence on electoral outcomes is as old as republican government itself. The society of republican Rome, we are told, was
starkly divided by class into patricians and plebeians. 13 8 Despite the far
greater numbers of plebeians ' 9 and their apparent hostility toward patricians, plebeian candidates frequently lost electoral contests pitting
candidates from each class against each other. 4 ' According to Livy,
this phenomenon was the result of "skilful canvassing" by the patrician
candidates, whose "veiled menaces masquerad[ed] as humble requests
for votes."''
In other words, the wealthy, powerful patricians
threatened and intimidated plebeian voters into voting for them.
The ability of patricians to win elections in this way was eventually undercut by a procedural reform: the introduction of secret ballots.
Romans had originally voted openly, each voter in turn stating his preference. " Under this system, those inclined to vote against the interests
of the powerful patricians could not do so without making themselves
known, and so, out of fear, frequently voted the patrician line.' 43 The
secret ballot eliminated this tactic and, according to Cicero, "deprived
the aristocracy of all its influence.""
Interestingly, it was not only ancient Romans who used a.voice
137. Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions:Legislative Power, Popular
Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1503 n.202 (1987) (citing K.
PHILLIPS & P. BLACKMAN, ELECTORAL REFORM AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 33 & n.7 (1975)).
138. See, e.g., Livy, 2 History of Rome, reprinted in LivY, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME
142 (A. Deselincourt trans. 1960) (describing early revolt by plebeians against patrician rule).
139. Over half the inhabitants of Rome were counted in the lowest of six classes based on
wealth and status. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 114 (M. Cranston trans. 1950) (1762).
See Livy, supra note 138, at 296-97 (describing qualifications of the six classes).
140. For example, the office of military tribune, open to plebeians and patricians alike, was
rarely won by a plebeian. Livy, supra note 138, at 296-97.
141. Id. at 297.
142. E.g., J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 139, at 119.
143. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, DE LEGIBUS 499 (C.W. Keyes trans. 1928).
144. Id.
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vote in a way that allowed candidates to exert pressure on voters. As
late as 1870,145 Virginians voted at congressional elections by lining up
at the polling place and stating their preference aloud directly in front
of the candidates, each of whom by custom was personally present. The
voter then received a handshake and some words of personal thanks
from the candidate for whom he voted.'1 6 Given the much smaller size
of local communities in those days, it seems likely that voters knew how
their public voting record would affect their private interests.
The use of electoral procedures to influence electoral outcomes is
not a practice limited to the early history of this country. In 1968, for
example, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of Ohio's election
code that essentially kept minor party candidates off the ballot in presidential elections. In Williams v. Rhodes, 4 ' the Court considered a law
that allowed the Republican and Democratic parties to secure a position on the ballot in presidential elections by polling ten percent of the
vote in the most recent gubernatorial election. 4 8 Any other party could
obtain a ballot position only if it collected a total number of voters'
signatures equal to fifteen percent of the total number of votes cast in
the preceding gubernatorial election.' 49 As a result, the Court said, it
was "virtually impossible for any party to qualify on the ballot except
the Republican and Democratic Parties." 5 Because getting on the ballot is an obvious prerequisite to winning an election, the Court found
that Ohio's election law scheme unconstitutionally burdened the right
to vote of supporters of independent candidates and parties under the
equal protection clause."'
The Supreme Court's decision immediately changed Ohio presidential politics. Whereas under the old rule no party other than the
Democratic and Republican parties had received any votes in Ohio
presidential elections from 1940 through 1964,52 in 1968, after the decision in Williams v. Rhodes, George Wallace's American Independent
See VA. CONST. art. II1, § 2 (1870) (requiring allelections to be by ballot); I A.E.D.
375 (1974).
146. E. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 185; D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE 115 (1958) [hereinafter BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS].
147. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
148. Id. at 25-26.
149. Id. at 24-25.
150. Id. at 25.
151. Id. at 31, 34.
152. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO UNITED STATES ELECTIONS 291-97 (1975).
145.

HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA
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Party obtained a ballot position and received 11.8 percent of the total
153
Ohio vote for president.
D. Electoral Outcomes and Governmental Legitimacy
1.

The Limits of Consent

The interdependence of electoral procedures and electoral outcomes is unavoidable, at least in a large republic such as the United
States. And because in a republic electoral outcomes reflect in a significant way the consent. of the people, electoral procedures have a great
potential to influence and perhaps undermine the legitimacy of an
elected government. Due to the open-ended nature of popular sovereignty, however, it is impossible to determine abstractly whether and to
what extent a particular election law or procedure affects the legitimacy of a particular government. As with any other aspect of government, one must know the particular preferences of the people who created it in order to judge its legitimacy.
Lockean theory says that the people, as a self-ruling sovereign entity, have the right to construct for themselves a virtually limitless variety of forms of government.154 As shown above, when the people choose
to create a republic, they introduce a certain potential for erroneous
identification of those whom the people wish to appoint as governmental agents-a potential for electoral inaccuracy. 55 It does not follow,
however, that this potential for inaccuracy necessarily detracts from
153. Id. at 298. The Court has acknowledged explicitly the effect that election laws can
have on the outcome of elections: "Each provision of [election codes], whether it governs the
registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting
process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual's right to vote ......
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); accord Republican Party v. Tashjian, 770
F.2d 265, 285 (2d Cir. 1985), affd, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
154. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, § 132, at 68-69 ("the commu-

nity may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good"); The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (right of the people to "institute new government, laying
its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their safety and happiness"). Lockean theory, however, also states that natural law places some constraints on the power to form a government. For example, the people
cannot submit themselves to slavery. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, §§ 22-24,
at 17-18.
155. This potential for error, though undoubtedly more frequent and pronounced in republics because of the use of elections, is not unique to republican government. Even if the people
wished to establish a government based on hereditary monarchy, as the British claimed to have
done, uncertainties concerning the identity of the legitimate monarch can creep in through ambiguities or omissions in the rules of succession. Compare J. RAWLS, supra note 54, at 85-86 (discussion of procedural justice).
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the legitimacy of the government: the people are just as free to tolerate
and consent to an electoral system that is inaccurate-i.e., one that
from time to time misidentifies the object of their choice-as they are

to demand an electoral system that is perfectly accurate.
As a result, the effect on governmental legitimacy of electoral inaccuracy introduced through procedural flaws or irregularities varies
according to the details of the actual agreement among society's members as to how they wish to govern themselves. Thus, one society might
demand absolute accuracy in its electoral outcomes and withhold its
consent from any candidate whose electoral victory is tainted by the
slightest hint of inaccuracy. Such a society might make it a crime not
to vote, 5 ' or make "the bribery of [even] one vote . . .sufficient to
void the nomination of a successful candidate."' 57 A society at the

other extreme might have such faith in its electoral process, or in the
people it has appointed to administer the process, that the society will
consent to be ruled by whoever wins any official election, no matter
how that election is actually conducted.
A third society somewhere in the middle might recognize the cost
and difficulty of achieving perfectly accurate electoral outcomes, 15 8 and
be willing to consent to the winners of elections that are felt to be rea-

sonably, if not perfectly, accurate. A society with this outlook might for
example consent to someone who won an election in which some ballots
were lost before being counted, if the loss were nevertheless highly un-

likely to affect the ultimate outcome.' 59 Many election laws in the
United States fall into this third category."'
156. This was, for example, the law in colonial Georgia. GA. CONST. art. XII (1777). More
recently, El Salvador instituted compulsory voting during the 1984 presidential election. Meislin,
Latin Vote: Making Do, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1984, at A6, col. 1.Citizens who failed to vote
could be fined, although the law was rarely enforced. Id.
157. Carter v. Lambert, 288 Ky. 39, 155 S.W.2d 38, 40 (1941).
158. The larger the society, the more costly and difficult it would be to achieve perfectly
accurate electoral outcomes. Some irregularity is bound to slip in when large numbers of people
vote, and a large society that insisted on this type of accuracy could find itself paralyzed by an
inability to conduct sufficiently accurate elections.
159. See, e.g., Finkelstein & Robbins, MathematicalProbabilityin Election Challenges, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 241 (1973) (discussion of judicial application and misapplication of this approach
under New York state law). See also Comment, Electoral Outcomes, supra note 54, at 905 n.57
(citing statutes and cases prohibiting the setting aside of election results unless the number of
suspect or invalid ballots is sufficient to change the election outcome).
160. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5943 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-527(c) (1987);
WASH. REV.CODE ANN. § 29.65.100 (1965); Williams v. Venneman, 42 Cal. App. 2d 618, 109
P.2d 757, 759 (1941); Pyron v. Joiner, 381 So. 2d 627, 630 (Miss. 1980). One result of these laws
is that someone who cheats can still win an election.
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Sometimes a society will make these determinations explicit, as by
enshrining them in a constitution. For example, article II, section 1,
clause 3 of the United States Constitution specifies in some detail the
process by which electoral votes for president are to be counted:
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two
Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with
themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the
Number of Votes for each; which List they shallsign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes
shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be
the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors
appointed

Presumably, these detailed instructions reflect society's determination
that the use of the particular process set forth will assure a result sufficiently accurate to justify society's consent to the winner. The provision
also suggests, by the same token, that when the government conducts
an election in strict accordance with the letter of the Constitution, the
winner of the election is justified in presuming that he has the people's
consent to exercise the office of President and that he and his administration's exercise of governmental power will be legitimate.
This provision of the Constitution is unusual: it is rare for the people to dictate in such detail the manner in which they would like things
done. More typical is article I, section 4, governing congressional elections, which states only that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations ....."" Even when society has not spoken in detail about electoral procedures, however, it is
safe to assume that there is some degree of inaccuracy of electoral outcomes that will not be tolerated, and in the presence of which the people's consent cannot be presumed. This would almost certainly be the
case where, for example, all the ballots cast are disregarded by the
ruling government, which instead fabricates results showing itself to be
unanimously reelected. 16 3 Whenever such a line is crossed, wherever it
may be, the government would not be legitimate because its elected
161.
162.
163.

U.S. CONST. of 1789, art. II,
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
See infra note 167.

§

I, cl.3 (1789).
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officials would lack 4 the actual consent of the people on whose behalf
16
they claim to act.
2.

The Role of the Court

The nature of elections under a Lockean constitution gives rise to
some difficult problems. Consent is the only basis of legitimate government, yet consent is manifested in a republic partly through elections, a
highly imperfect medium for the expression of the popular will. The
Constitution sets the terms under which the people's consent can be
presumed. But the Constitution is vague in many respects about the
ways in which elections should be conducted and the degree to which
the people are willing to tolerate electoral inaccuracy before their consent can no longer justifiably be presumed. Lurking in the background
is the fact that the people always retain the right to withdraw their
consent from the government without regard to whether it is formed
consistent with the Constitution; they can abandon the Constitution itself if they wish. The chaos that would result from such a turn of
events is something nobody wants.
On the one occasion when just such a chaotic situation was
brought before the Supreme Court, the Court declined to get involved.
In Luther v. Borden,1 1 5 two rival governments each claiming to be the
legitimate agent of the people of Rhode Island asked the Court to
choose between them. The Court refused, calling the dispute a political
question incapable of judicial resolution. While the Court has thus declined to consider the most direct and pressing issues of governmental
legitimacy, the Court has frequently reviewed the constitutionality of
election laws. The Court's role in such cases can be quite significant
because, in many instances, election laws represent deliberate legislative attempts to prevent precisely the type of electoral irregularities
that have the potential to call into question the accuracy of the electoral outcome and, consequently, the legitimacy of the elected
government.
164. This is not to say that the only possibility in such a situation is the type of violent
resistance associated with the deposing of usurpers. It is possible under the theory of popular
sovereignty for the people to give actual consent to the government even after an act of usurpation. See J.LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, § 198, at 101 (usurper has no right to
govern "until the people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented to allow and
confirm in him the power he has till then usurped"). Such a turn of events bears more than
passing resemblance to Hume's suggestion that government rests not on active consent, but on
passive acquiescence. See supra note 38.
165. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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The next sections give a brief overview of federal election legislation, and show how election laws frequently aim at enhancing electoral
accuracy and therefore assuring governmental legitimacy.

III.

THE NEWTONIAN MECHANICS OF ELECTORAL ACCURACY:
NINETEENTH CENTURY LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO
CLEAN

Up

ELECTIONS

Federal election laws fall roughly into two main groups. In the
first group are laws prohibiting electoral violence, intimidation, bribery,
and fraud. Electoral fraud includes such schemes as multiple voting,
impersonation of voters, destruction or miscounting of ballots, ballotbox stuffing, and the like. These laws first appeared in 1870 immediately following the ratification of the fifteenth amendment, and occupied Congress intermittently until as recently as 1965. For want of a
better term, I shall call this group of election laws "Newtonian." First,
they deal largely with physical -offenses against the election process-fists and sticks, theft and destruction. Second, they seem to aim
at removing influences that are considered "external" to the election
process, as though to allow what we might call bodies already in motion-i.e., voters-to avoid being deflected by these external forces
from following their original path toward casting the vote of their
choice. Third, despite the fact that these laws occupied Congress until
well into this century, the laws in this first group seem to represent an
essentially
nineteenth-century
approach
to nineteenth-century
problems. Newtonian election laws generally have fared well in the Supreme Court against constitutional challenges.
The second group consists primarily of campaign finance reforms
such as contribution and expenditure limitations and public financing,
and communication-oriented laws such as bans on exit-polling intended
to prevent early media projections of election winners. I shall call laws
in this second group "modern" in order to distinguish them from the
first group, but also because they seem to conceive of the voting process
in a more modern, almost relativistic way. These laws in a sense reject
the Newtonian idea of a voter as a body in fixed motion relative to
some absolute standard, whose voting inclinations can be given effect
simply by removing external impediments to their expression. Instead,
modern election laws seem to view the formulation of a voting decision
more as a process subject to a wide variety of subtle and occasionally
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invisible influences.' 66 The modern variety of election laws have fared
much worse than their Newtonian predecessors in cases challenging
their constitutionality. A discussion of these laws and cases is deferred

to Part IV.
Before turning to the laws themselves, let us consider the abuses at
which they were aimed.
A.

The Persistence of Electoral Abuses

The modern American mind tends to regard gross electoral abuse
and fraud as something of a third-world problem: one reads of a
Marcos or a Noriega stealing an election 6 7 and thanks heaven that
such a thing could never happen here. In fact, election fraud of an
appalling sort is a venerable Anglo-American tradition predating in
North America the founding of the United States, and extending in

England well back into parliamentary history.
The most common and accepted form of electoral abuse was brib-

ery, or, in its most widespread form, "treating"-that is, "treating the
voters to food and drink in heroic quantities' 6 6 8 in order to gain their
favor. The practice of treating, evidently universal in eighteenth-cen-

tury England, transformed election campaigns into contests between
the candidates to provide the most whiskey to eligible voters. Voters
came to expect and demand such favors: in the York election of 1774, a
mob threatened a candidate who had not provided what they considered to be an appropriate amount of drink.' 69 While treating was prevalent, candidates were by no means above offering cash directly in ex166. See Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989) (arguing that shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian
scientific paradigms has filtered into society and the law).
167. See, e.g., Gwertzman, U.S. Adviser to Manila Vote Observers Gives Details of Fraud,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1986, at A4, col. 1; Groson, Noriega Stealing Election, Carter Says, N.Y.
Times, May 9, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
168. E. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 176. I am indebted to Morgan's account for many of the
following examples.
169. L. NAMIER & J. BROOKE, 1 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1754-1790, at 400-02 (1964),
quoted in E. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 183. In this country, none other than James Madison
himself learned the hard way that treating and flattery of voters was expected. In 1777, Madison
ran for the Virginia legislature. It was the "usage, for the Candidates to recommend themselves to
the voters, not only by personal solicitation, but by the corrupting influence of spirituous liquors,
and other treats .
I..."
I PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 193 (W. Hutchinson & W. Rachal eds.
1962) (excerpt from 1832 autobiographical sketch). Madison, regarding these practices as "inconsistent with the purity of moral and of republican principles," declined to campaign in the usual
way. He was defeated, "his abstinence being represented as the effect of pride or parsimony." Id.
See also BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS, supra note 146, at 114-15.
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change for votes. For example, in the 1780 parliamentary election from
Sussex, a candidate addressing a private club said that ."if they would
honour him with their suffrages he would return the favour with a present of thirty guineas to each voter." 7 ' After making this speech, the
candidate did not even receive a commitment of support from the club;
the chairman promised to seek another candidate17 1"who would speak in
a language equally intelligible and convincing.1
Where bribery was insufficient to guarantee a victory, candidates
and their supporters occasionally turned to violence. In -the Westminster election of 1784, the polling place became the site of a brawl between supporters of the candidates, each group attempting to secure its
own partisans access to the ballot box. An American observer reported:
"clubs, fists, and canes were in brisk motion throughout the
crowd. . . . [M]any of both parties [were left] mangled and
1' 72
bloody.'
Such practices were equally common in America, even after ratification of the Constitution. Following the 1794 congressional election of
Francis Preston as a representative from Virginia, a House committee
investigating the election found that supporters of Preston threatened
to beat supporters of his opponent and that soldiers stationed at the
door to the polling place refused to admit supporters of Preston's opponent. A challenge in Congress by the loser was rejected and Preston
seated, partly on the grounds that his election was considered to be
73
relatively clean by contemporary southern standards." Even in relatively sedate New England, with its tradition of secret ballots and sober, Calvinist regard for self-government in the service of God, 174 election abuse occurred from time to time. The 1811 election in Salem,,
Massachusetts was tainted by at least one instance of multiple voting,175 and inthe 1820 election in Williamstown, Massachusetts a voter
170.
MORGAN,

L. NAMIER & J.BROOKE, 1
supra note 2, at 177.

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

1754-1790, at 389, quoted in E.

171. Id.
172. E. WATSON, MEN AND TIMES OF THE REVOLUTION 217-18 (1856), quoted in E. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 182.
173. E. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 187-88.
174. E. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 183 ("in New England, where a secret ballot generally
prevailed, elections were pretty tame affairs"); D. LUTZ, supra note 19, at 24-31 (early colonial
founding documents reflected goal of self-government in service of God).
175. Commonwealth v. Silsbee, 9 Mass. 417 (1812).
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repeatedly attempted physically to seize the ballot box to prevent re176
election of the incumbent.

There can be no doubt, however, that American, if not human,
ingenuity at perpetrating electoral fraud reached its zenith in the postCivil War south where whites stubbornly and persistently resisted attempts to enfranchise black citizens. The most blatant resistance to
black voting was violent: blacks who attempted to vote were threatened,
intimidated, harassed and beaten. 77 The luckier ones were paid to stay
away from the polls.' 78 More commonly, though, blacks were disenfranchised in less obvious or detectable ways. One technique was to cut
off black participation in the political process at its inception by simply

making blacks ineligible to vote, in direct defiance of the fifteenth
amendment. 79 Where blacks were legally eligible to vote, they were
frequently refused registration. 8° Election officials developed a variety
of methods to avoid registering blacks, including the discriminatory ad-

ministration of literacy tests' and citizenship tests, 82 and the implementation of voter identification requirements. 8 3 Poll taxes also were
used to keep blacks away, and if a black voter was able to pay the poll
tax and sought to do so, his offer to pay would simply be refused.'8 4
When blacks managed to register to vote, their names were merely
purged from the lists.' 85

176. Commonwealth v. Hoxey, 16 Mass. 385 (1820).
177. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875); United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (No. 14,893); United States
v. Amsden, 6 F. 819 (D. Ind. 1881).
178. Lackey v. United States, 107 F. 114 (6th Cir. 1901).
179. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915);
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
180. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128
(1965); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962), afid, 371 U.S. 37 (1962);
United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Ramsey, 331 F.2d 824
(5th Cir. 1964).
181. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128 (1965); United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Raines,
189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
182. United States v. Penton, 212 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
183. United States v. Association of Citizens Councils, 196 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. La. 1961);
United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962); United States v. Ward, 222 F.
Supp. 617 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1965).
184. United States v. Dogan, 314 F.2d 767.(5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Munford, 16
F. 223 (E.D. Va. 1883).
185. United States v. Association of Citizens Councils, 196 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. La. 1961);
United States v. Wilder, 222 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. La. 1963); United States v. Crawford, 229 F.
Supp. 898 (W.D. La. 1964).
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Blacks who successfully navigated the treacherous waters of voter
registration might find themselves barred from voting by other obstacles. They might be ineligible to vote at a primary election in which,
for all practical purposes, the winner of the general election would be
selected.18 6 If eligible in theory to vote in the primary, they might be

excluded from eligibility for party membership, likewise depriving them
from voting in a crucial primary. 187 If they managed to appear at a
general election, and were not simply turned away from the polls,' 8 8
their votes might be discarded,"8 9 deliberately miscounted,"'9 or diluted
through ballot box stuffing.' 9' And if whites founds themselves compelled to permit and properly count the votes of blacks, they might
attempt to redraw election districts to exclude blacks altogether,' 9 2 or
to apportion legislative representation so as to dilute black influence.' 93
It would be wrong to assume, however, that all American election

fraud since the Civil War has been aimed at blacks. Abuses often have
been employed for political reasons unrelated or not clearly related to
race; these abuses have included the casting of fraudulent ballots,""
98
97
impersonation of voters, ' 9 bribery,'." multiple voting, vote-buying,
restrictive ballot access rules, 9 and even a sham candidacy. 200 Nor is
election fraud and abuse exclusively a thing of the past in the United
States. For example, in the November 1982 general election in Chicago, twenty-six people, mostly election officials, were indicted for elec-

tion fraud. Their crimes included forging signatures on ballots of voters
186. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
187. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
188. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
189. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1875).
190. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ex
parte Perkins, 29 F. 900 (C.C.D. Ind. 1887).
191. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
192. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
193. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
194. Welch v. McKenzie, 592 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Miss. 1984), afid, 765 F.2d 1311 (5th
Cir. 1985).
195. Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308 (1894).
196. United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127
(1903); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. McBosley, 29 F.
897 (D.C.D. Ind. 1886).
197. McBosley, 29 F. at 897.
198. State v. Jackson, 73 Me. 91 (1881).
199. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
200. Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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who failed to vote and marking and casting those ballots; impersonation
of voters; false registration of non-residents; rendering improper "assistance" to elderly and disabled voters; vote-buying; fraudulent dissemination and voting of absentee ballots; illegal registration of aliens; and
the use of armed violence against voters and campaign workers. 20 1 In
one precinct, election officials staged their own private election by
marking a ballot with a straight Democratic ticket and running that
ballot through the tabulating machine over 200 times.20 2 The United
States Attorney whose jurisdiction included Chicago estimated that ten
percent of the entire vote in the city during the November 1982 election was fraudulent.0 3
B.

Legislative Controls on Electoral Abuses

According to the Lockean theory of popular sovereignty developed
earlier, election abuses can pose grave threats to the accuracy of electoral outcomes, and thus to governmental legitimacy.. The exclusion of
eligible voters from the electoral process, whether by violence or any
other means, deprives society of data crucial to the accurate identification of the winner of the election, and thus impairs society's ability to
determine to whom its consent has been given. Similarly, the discarding
or mistabulation of votes actually cast violates the social rule of decision that the majority's preferences are to be given effect. In these circumstances, the legitimacy of the elected government may well become
doubtful; and the greater the electoral accuracy demanded by the particular society involved, the greater the doubts concerning the legitimacy of a government elected through the use or with the assistance of
fraudulent electoral practices.
From this perspective, it is possible to view legislation aimed at
curbing electoral abuses as designed to enhance the accuracy of electoral outcomes and, ultimately, to enhance or assure the legitimacy of the
elected government. A brief review of major federal legislation enacted
to curb these abuses 'will help to clarify this point.
201.

VOTING RIGHTS ACT: CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,

202.

98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

Id. at 17-18.

203. Id. at 6. See also United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding
convictions related to election fraud at Chicago's November, 1982 election).
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1. Newtonian Election Laws
The first significant federal legislation designed to eliminate electoral abuses was the Enforcement Act of 1870.204 As its title suggests,
the Enforcement Act was enacted to enforce the fifteenth amendment,
which took effect that same year, and which prohibited abridgement of
the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." 2 0 5 The Enforcement Act required that all citizens qualified
by law to vote be allowed to vote and that they be given an equal opportunity to perform acts prerequisite to voting, such as registering to
vote and paying poll taxes. It also banned the use of force, bribery,
threats, and intimidation to interfere with voting or its prerequisites, as
well as impersonation of voters and multiple voting.20 6
These provisions of the Enforcement Act can be said to enhance
electoral accuracy. Consider, for example, the requirements that all eligible voters be permitted to vote and to perform all prerequisites to
voting. The purpose of these provisions is evidently to ensure that all
members of society-including former slaves, who were made citizens
by the fourteenth amendment-have the opportunity to voice their
preferences at the polls and thereby to participate in the process of
selecting governmental agents. Legitimacy requires the consent of the
governed, not just a small, self-selected portion of the governed. To exclude some of the governed against their will from the process by which
popular consent is expressed is to collect information provided by a
subgroup of the people rather than by all the people. Such an election
can only express the consent of some body other than the true sovereign, which is, by definition, the society as a whole. Consequently, the
election result can be said to be inaccurate because it fails .to consult
and count the expressed preferences of all who are entitled to participate in the sovereign appointment decision, and because it fails to apply
the social rule of decision-majority rule, in our case-to the preferences of all of society's individual members. A law forbidding such exclusionary practices can be seen as a reflection of legislative concern
that officials elected only by a self-selected subgroup of the people-in
204. 16 Stat. 140 (1870). Although the Enforcement Act was the first major piece of federal election legislation, the earliest congressional use of its Article I, § 4 power to regulate elections was the Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 14, 5 Stat. 491 (1842), which required representatives to Congress to be elected within their states by district, rather than at-large. Id., § 2.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
206. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 14, §§ 1-6, 16 Stat. 140-41.
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this case, whites-are not truly representative, and are therefore of possibly suspect legitimacy.
The same is true when citizens are permitted to cast votes, but
their votes are discarded. Under a Lockean system of popular sovereignty, the government does not permit people to go to the polls to
make them feel good; it lets them go to the polls because it needs to
know whom those people wish to appoint as their agent. An election in
which votes are discarded (or miscounted or diluted through ballot box
stuffing) fails adequately to consult those who must be consulted if the
election result is to be meaningful, and fails to apply the previously
agreed upon criterion of majority rule to the actual expressed preferences of the people. Laws that prohibit these practices attempt to make
elections more accurate reflections of society's preferences and consent,
thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the elected government.
The Enforcement Act's prohibitions on violence and intimidation
work identically insofar as violence and intimidation are directed at
keeping eligible voters from participating in the electoral process. The
Act's prohibitions also apply, however, to instances in which a voter is
intimidated, not into abstaining from voting but into casting a vote
against his true wishes. The choice by Congress to prohibit this practice
can be seen as expressing a legislative judgment that votes cast under
the influence of physical intimidation are somehow improper-that
they do not "count" in the right way, and that elections won on the
basis of votes extracted under physical duress do not truly reflect the
consent of the people. To prohibit such practices, then, is to make possible the casting of votes that in some vital sense express the true preferences of the electorate. These prohibitions ensure that electoral outcomes more accurately reflect the consent of all the governed rather
than the most violent subgroup of the governed. The same is true of the
Enforcement Act's prohibition on bribery. A bribed vote in Congress'
judgment no more expresses the type of consent required for legitimate
elective government than does a physically coerced vote. Again, the
prohibition of vote-buying can be seen as improving the accuracy of
electoral outcomes by making them more accurately reflect the true
preferences of the people, unimpaired by any form of duress.20 7
207. Of course, a bribed vote does express a voluntary preference of a sort-a decision to
vote for a particular candidate for purposes of financial gain-but even so, Congress has rejected
bribed votes as the basis for a proper election result. See MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra
note 74, at 402-03 (Gouverneur Morris, Aug. 7, 1787) ("Give the votes to people who have no
property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. . . .The man who does
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Subsequent federal election laws of the Newtonian variety fall into
the same general pattern. The Force Act of 1871 strengthened the Enforcement Act by forbidding the use of force and violence with respect
to voter registration, and established a mechanism. for federal supervision of polling places.20 a The Ku Klux Act of 1871 prohibited conspiracies designed to deprive individuals of, or hinder them in the exercise
of, their right to vote. 20° The Repeal Act of 1894210 repealed most of
the measures enacted in the Enforcement Act and Force Act, but several were restored in the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.11 In 1940,
Congress passed the Hatch Act, which, among other things, put a new
twist on attempts to eliminate duress in the voting process by prohibiting incumbents from using their powers over political patronage to re212
quire electoral and campaign support from government employees.
Finally, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 enacted in greatly strengthened
form similar prohibitions on election fraud and exclusionary practices
aimed at disenfranchising black voters. 213 By stressing free participation in elections and the elimination of all types of voting fraud, all of
these laws can be seen as congressional attempts to enhance the accuracy of electoral outcomes and, by implication, to enhance governmental legitimacy.
2.

Legislative History

It would be an exaggeration to contend that the laws described
above were justified by Congress on the ground that they enhanced
electoral accuracy or governmental legitimacy. For the most part, the
legislators who passed these laws had many other concerns;21 4 in fact,
not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates the vote.").
208. The Force Act, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
209. Ku Klux Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
210. Repeal Act, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (1894).
211. Corrupt Practice Act, Pub. L. No. 506, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070 (1925).
212. Hatch Act, Pub. L. No. 252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1940).
213. Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
214. The Civil War constitutional amendments and enforcing legislation were considered
against a backdrop of concern to grant to blacks a great assortment of advantages which they had
previously been denied, including freedom from physical restraint, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, citizenship, id. amend. XIV, § 1, the right to equal treatment and due process, id., and political
rights, id. amend. XV. These advantages have ever since been grouped collectively in American
discourse under the rubric of "civil rights." While the different types of civil rights are similar in
many ways, the now well-established practice of using the same term to describe them all has
tended to obscure some of the significant differences among them. Most pertinent here is the fact
that the right to vote is tied to governmental legitimacy in a republic in a way that the right to
due process or equal protection, or even freedom from physical restraint, is not: the former is
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most of these legislators seemed to lack, especially with increasing distance from the Revolution, a fully articulated political theory of the
Constitution. It is no exaggeration, however, to say that from time to
time individual legislators expressed an awareness of the Lockean consequences of election reform legislation, and appealed to notions of popular sovereignty to support such legislation.
For example, during the debates over the Enforcement Act of

1870, Senator Carl Schurz of Missouri made the following argument in
favor of its adoption:
What is true self-government? . . . True self-government consists in a political
organization of society which secures to the generality of its members, that is to
say, to the whole people, and not to a part of them only, the right and the means
to cooperate in the management of their common affairs, either directly, or,
where direct action is impossible, by a voluntary delegation of power. It ceases to
be true self-government as soon as the powers of government are conferred as an
exclusive privilege on one portion of the people and is withheld from the rest.
And how is self-government exercised? By the right of suffrage.21

Senator Schurz's argument relies on a considerably Lockean framework of popular self-rule through elections by the people. His notion
that exclusion of a portion of the people-i.e., blacks-from participation in elections threatens self-government is in accord with the Lockean idea that governmental legitimacy depends upon the consent of the
governed.
An even more explicitly Lockean sentiment was expressed the following year during debates on the Force Act of 1871. Representative
John Churchill of New York, the bill's sponsor, explicitly argued that
the bill was necessary to enhance the accuracy of election results at

federal elections:
[T]he Government of the United States was founded upon . . . the principle that
government depends upon the will of the governed; in other words, that the will
of the majority . . . when that will can be ascertained, is the proper law of the
country. The whole value, the whole moral force of this principle depends, however, upon the question whether or not, after the election shall be held, the peoalways essential in some degree to the appointment of an agent preferred by the members of
society, see supra text accompanying notes 105-26, whereas the latter are choices concerning the
scope of governmental power that may differ from society to society. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (right to Vote is guarantor of other rights). One wonders whether these
differences would have been more apparent to legislators had the extension to blacks of the right
to vote been considered separately from the extension of other civil rights.
215. 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 477 (B. Schwartz ed.
1970).
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pie believe that the result of the election, as declared by the authorities who
preside over it, expresses truly the wishes of the majority of the people.
. .[F]or
[
some years past grave doubts have prevailed in different portions
of this country as to whether the declared results of elections have truly expressed the will of the people. . . .[T]he Constitution reserved to Congress to
determine the manner in which elections shall be held, and thereby to insure that
21
the result, when declared, shall be the real will of the majority of the people.

A similar defense of both the Enforcement Act and the Force Act

was made in 1894 when, after decades of Republican control, Democrats regained control of Congress and repealed much of the fifteenth
amendment enforcement legislation. Representative Marriott Brosius of
Pennsylvania, a leading Republican opponent of the repeal, made a
lengthy and passionate speech on the House floor:
[Tihat governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is
a proposition which expresses the only reason for the existence of our form of
government. . . . [A]ny civil polity or mode of administration which lodges
power anywhere against the consent of the people gives birth to an unjust power,
and to that extent is a subversion of our form of government.
. .[C]onsent,
[
to be effective, must be expressed. We have no mode in this
Government of determining questions . . . [except by number]. . . . [W]e can
only count, and the tally decides. The agency by which consent is ascertained is
suffrage. Here, then, are the two pillars upon which our Federal Government was
erected-"consent," the supreme determining power, and "suffrage," its constitutional mode of expression. . . . [A]ny abuse or usurpation that overawes or
suppresses the one or impairs the purity or efficacy of the other is equally subversive of our system of government, and equally fatal to constitutional liberty.
• . .In forms of government in which sovereignty resides in the people and
speaks through popular elections, a free ballot and a fair count are the very
breath of the nation's life; and any abuse or fraud which hinders the free expression of the sovereign
will at the ballot box gags the nation while highwaymen'rob
217
it of its liberty.

This is a clear and strong expression of a view linking clean election
laws to the accuracy of electoral outcomes, and linking electoral outcomes, in turn, to the expression of popular consent and governmental
legitimacy.
The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 contains

similar expressions. Senator Everett Dirksen, a sponsor of the bill,
opened the Senate debate on the legislation with a speech in which he
216.
217.

Id. at 565.
Id. at 816, 817, 820.
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asked: "How then shall there be government by the people if some of
the people cannot speak? How obtain the consent of the governed when
a segment of those governed cannot express themselves?" 2 1 He went
on to argue that the proposed Voting Rights Act would solve this problem by assuring that the voice of blacks would be heard at the polls.2 19
In addition, eight Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee filed
a report expressing similar sentiments. "Fundamental to our democracy," they said, "is the right of each qualified citizen to participate in
the selection of those who will serve him as his government."22 They
opposed the bill, however, because, in their view, it had the potential to
permit voting by ineligible individuals. This, they said, is dangerous because it would "create a mechanism which could well mean the election
of [an] official . . . who has failed to receive the largest number of
'
votes cast by legally qualified electors."2 21
3.

Judicial Interpretations: Electoral "Purity" and the "Free"
Vote

The Supreme Court has had occasion to review much of the
Newtonian federal election legislation aimed at preventing electoral
fraud and abuse. The Court's decisions are significant in two respects.
First, the Court has shown little hesitation in upholding such laws, at
least to the extent that they regulate elections to federal office.22 2 Second, although the Court has never grounded an opinion upholding election legislation on an explicitly Lockean theory of popular sovereignty
or electoral accuracy, it has on several occasions made arguments that
have a distinctly Lockean ring.
One of the earliest such decisions, and possibly the one most
strongly supportive of the congressional power to regulate elections, is
Ex parte Yarbrough.22 3 Yarbrough, a member of the Klan, 22 4 was con218. 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1511 (B. Schwartz ed.
1970).
219. Id. at 1512-14.
220. H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2437, 2465.
221. HR. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 41, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2437, 2469.
222. The Court struck down several provisions of the Enforcement Act on the ground that
they purported to reach exclusively state elections to state offices. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S.
127 (1903); accord Lackey v. United States, 107 F. 114 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 621
(1901). The Court declined to read the provisions at issue narrowly to apply only to elections at
which a federal office was at stake.
223. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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victed under the Enforcement Act of beating a black man who was

attempting to vote at a Georgia congressional election. Yarbrough
sought to have his conviction overturned on the ground that the provision under which he was convicted exceeded congressional authority.
The.Court viewed this argument with great skepticism:
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose executive
head and legislative body are both elective, whose most numerous and powerful
branch of the legislature is elected by the people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this election from the influence of violence, of corruption,
and of fraud, is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the
gravest consideration.""

After reviewing congressional exercises of the power to regulate elections under article I, section 4, the Court turned to the provisions at
issue, which it characterized as "additional laws for the free, the pure,
and the safe exercise of this right of voting." 2 6 Yarbrough argued,
among other things, that Congress could not punish violence directed at
a voter because its interest in protecting an individual's vote was insufficient-far less, for example, than its interest in protecting a federal
election official acting in the course of his duties. The Court rejected

this argument, denying that the need to protect the election from violence arises exclusively from the need to protect individuals from physical harm. Instead, the Court said, the regulation of elections also serves
broader societal needs:
[I]t is the duty of . . . [the United States] government to see that . . . [the
voter] may exercise this right freely, and to protect him from violence while so
doing, or on account of so doing. This duty does not arise solely from the interest
of the party concerned, but from the necessity of the government itself, that its
service shall be free from the adverse influence of force and fraud practised on its
agents, and that the votes by which its members of Congress and its President
are elected shall be the free votes of the electors, and the officers thus chosen the
free and uncorrupted choice of those who have the right to take part in that
2 27
choice.

The Court later reiterated this proposition, calling it "essential to the
successful working of this government" that elected officials be "the
free choice of the people," and concluded with an acknowledgement of
224.

R.

CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCEss

225. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657 (1884).
226. Id. at 662.
227. Id. (emphasis in original).

30 (1970).
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the danger in a republican government of the "temptations to control
. . .elections by violence and by corruption."22 8
The Court has generally upheld without difficulty the types of
anti-fraud election laws represented by the Enforcement Act, the Force
Act, the Corrupt Practices Act and the Voting Rights Act.2 29 In many
of its opinions, the concepts of "free" votes and "pure" elections resurface in the Court's analysis. For instance, In re Coy23 0 involved the
conviction of an election judge for tampering with poll lists. The Court
rejected a challenge to Congress' power to punish election fraud when
the fraud was aimed at improperly influencing the election only of state
officials, even though candidates for federal offices also were on the ballot. In so holding, the Court not only related federal elections laws to
the goal of "pure" elections, but also explicitly viewed the laws as
aimed at achieving more accurate electoral outcomes:
Crimes against the ballot have become so numerous and so serious that the attention of all legislative bodies has been turned with anxious solicitude to the
means of preventing them, and to the object of securing purity in elections and
accuracy in the returns by which their result is ascertained.23 '

The Court took a similar position in United States v. Classic,2 32 a case
involving the alteration and false counting of primary election ballots.
It again rejected a constitutional challenge, this time on the ground
that the congressional power to regulate elections did not extend to primary elections. 23 In response to the claim that congressional power
was restricted by article I, section 4 to general elections, the Court
stated: "That the free choice by the people of representatives in Congress . . . was one of the great purposes of our constitutional scheme of
government cannot be doubted." 234 And in Reynolds v. Sims,2"5 the
Court struck down a discriminatory redistricting plan, noting, in somewhat Lockean language, that "As long as ours is a representative form
of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of govern228.

Id. at 666.

229. E.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); United States v. Wurzbach,
280 U.S. 396 (1930); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399
(1879); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); but see United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
230. 127 U.S. 731 (1888).
231. Id. at 755.
232. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
233. This question had been reserved in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
234. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941).
235. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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.245

ment elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the

right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock
of our political system."23 '
As a rule, then, the Court has been willing to uphold federal laws

prohibiting conduct that undermines what the Court views as free and
pure elections. This concept of free and pure elections-by which the
Court seems to mean elections conducted without fraud and violence
and in which the true choice of the people is identified 2 37 -is highly
reminiscent of Lockean notions of popular sovereignty, and is fully consistent with the Lockean-based view of election law as a guarantor of
electoral accuracy and governmental legitimacy. 38
IV.

MODERN ELECTION LAWS

By the end of the 1960s, Congress had provided legislative remedies for the types of electoral abuses that first concerned it nearly a
century earlier. The panoply of election laws then in place, the Court
observed, banned "sophisticated as well as simple-minded" types of
election fraud. 3 9 Under these laws, no citizen of the United States eligible to vote in a federal election could be kept from the polls by any

form of duress, nor could that person's vote be discarded, miscounted
or diluted. Elections would work in the way that our society intended
them to work: any eligible citizen who wished to participate in the
choice of an agent could do so, and the principle of majority rule would
be applied uniformly to all the votes recorded. 4 0 As a result, elections
236. Id. at 562.
237. This concept may have its roots in early state constitutional guaranties of free and
equal elections. See MAss. CONST. of 1780, § 10; DEL. CONST., Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules § 6 (1776); DEL. CONST. of 1792 art. I, § 3; N.H. CONST., Bill of Rights, pt. 1, art.
11 (1783) (all requiring that elections be free or equal, or both). This formulation may in turn

echo Locke, see J. LOCKE,

THE SECOND TREATISE,

supra note 40, § 158, at 83 (people desire a

"fair and equal representative"), and could well be rooted in rationalist notions of free will as

reflected in electoral choice. See generally J.
ING, supra note 54.

LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTAND-

238. See also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 329-30 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 796-98 (1983); United States v. McBosley, 29
F. 897, 899 (D. Ind. 1886); State v. Jackson, 73 Me. 91, 94 (1881); Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d
661, 536 P.2d 1337, 1348, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388 (1975); Cannon v. Justice Court for Lake
Valley Judicial Dist., 61 Cal. 2d 446, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232, 393 P.2d 428, 432 (1964); State ex
rel. Hampel v. Mitten, 227 Wis. 598, 278 N.W. 431, 435 (1938).
239. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965) (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268, 275 (1939)).
240. In many respects, however, Congress has chosen to rely on protections provided by
state law. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (Congress has power to alter state election laws). For
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would be much more likely than ever before to identify accurately
those individuals whom the people, in their sovereign capacity, chose as
agents to exercise the enormous powers of government.
Ironically, at about this same time Congress began to perceive
other problems with the electoral process. Principal among these
problems was the increasing role of money in the conduct of campaigns
for federal office. Campaigns, Congress noted, were becoming increasingly expensive, and were being fought more and more in the arena of
mass media advertising, a costly practice. As a result, Congress felt,
candidates were required to spend inordinate amounts of time raising
funds. They were becoming unduly susceptible to the improper influence of large contributors. Most important for purposes of this analysis,
Congress came to feel that the expenditure of money had the potential
to become an overwhelming determinant of electoral outcomes.
As it had in the past, Congress responded to these concerns with
legislation. This legislation, like earlier election legislation, could be
characterized as an effort to improve the accuracy of electoral outcomes and to protect governmental legitimacy, and might have been
expected to encounter no more resistance from the Court than had similar legislation already on the books. But the new breed of election laws
were different in a significant respect: they tended to regulate either
speech itself, or conduct intimately related to speech. Consequently, despite the similarity of purpose among the Newtonian and modern variety of election laws, the Court handled the new legislation very differently, declaring law after law unconstitutional under the first
amendment.
A.

The New Legislation

The most significant legislation directed at the problem of money
in the electoral process was the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA)."4 ' A comprehensive legislative effort, FECA set limits on the
amount that an individual could contribute to candidates for federal
office, on the amount that individuals could spend independently on behalf of candidates, and on overall campaign spending by candidates for
federal office. In addition, FECA required public disclosure of camexample, Congress has never enacted a comprehensive federal election code regulating the details
of voting methods.
241. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1982) and in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
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paign contributions and expenditures, created a system of public financing of presidential campaigns, and established the Federal Election
Commission to oversee and enforce the legislation.2 42
Congress advanced a variety of justifications for FECA. Among
these were the prevention of "quid pro quo corruption"-the repayment of large campaign contributions with political or legislative favors
by successful candidates-and the preservation of public confidence in
government and in the electoral and political processes.2 4 3 Yet an
equally important congressional purpose was to prevent what Congress
felt amounted to the buying and selling-or at least the public perception of buying and selling-of federal offices, not through the medium
of direct bribes to voters, but through massively financed campaigns
and political advertising. Thus, a congressional report supporting campaign finance reform criticized existing election laws as "embodying
out-of-date remedies for today's problems in the conduct of elections
for Federal office." 244 What was needed, the report said, was legislation
addressing the widespread perception "that a candidate can buy an
election by spending large amounts of money in a campaign. '"245 Another report, after documenting the increasing costs of campaigns for
federal office, stated bluntly: "Such costs and expenditures have been
escalating so as to threaten to make money the principal determinant
246
of election to such offices."
But unlike old-fashioned bribery, in which candidates actually
bought. elections by paying the electorate to vote for them, this modern
form of election-buying was thought to work differently, through an
improper form of persuasion akin to that used to sell products in an age
of media advertising campaigns. For example, a report accompanying
an early version of the bill that became FECA claimed:
This will make possible parity of exposure on [mass] media as between candi-

242. Some elements of the Federal Election Campaign Act, such as contribution limitations,
had been enacted previously in some specific contexts. See, e.g., Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,
§ 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925) (ban on political contributions by banks and corporations). The
Federal Election Campaign Act, however, went. far beyond these early efforts, and was the first
such statute to undergo judicial review under the first amendment. Cf United States v. Congress
of Indus. Organizs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
243. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 -25-27 (1976) (per curiam).
244. H.R. REP. No. 564, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1971).
245. Id. at 4. See also H.R. REP. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974) ("Under the
present law the impression persists that a candidate can buy an election by simply spending large
sums in a campaign.").
246. H.R. REP. No. 565, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1971).
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dates competing for the same Federal elective office. Thus, such candidates will
be competing for the votes of the electorate on their merits rather than on the
basis of exposure as in the case of such commodities as toothpaste, soft drinks
and beer, aspirin and razor blades." '

Another report stated similarly:
The electorate is entitled to base its judgment on a straightforward presentation
of a candidate's qualifications for public office and programs for the Nation
rather than on a sophisticated advertising program which is encouraged by the
infusion of vast amounts of money." '

These comments were echoed frequently during the floor debates on

FECA. Senator Muskie, for example, claimed that "millions are spent
to sweep men into office on a wave of superficial advertising more appropriate to soap or cereal than national politics." 2 9 Representative

Madden likewise defended the legislation as necessary "so that the
minds of .the American voters are not high-pressured and warped with
multi-million-dollar financed political propaganda." 2 50 In other words,
the increasing role of money in campaigns for office had created a situ-

ation in which voters, although not subjected to the direct kind of duress exemplified by physical violence or bribery with liquor or cash,
were nevertheless put under a form of pressure that invidiously distorted their judgment and improperly affected the outcome of the
election. 2 51
Congressional passage of FECA touched a resonant chord nationwide, sparking a flurry of state and local legislative activity aimed at
reducing the impact of money and the mass media on electoral out247.

H.R. REP. No. 565, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1971).

248. HR. REP. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
249. 117 CONG. REC. 29,321 (1971).
250. Id. at 42,056. See also id. at 29,322 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge), 30,072 (Sen. Hart),
42,063 (Rep. Staggers), 42,068 (Rep. Conte), 42,072 (Rep. Thompson), and 42,075-76 (Rep.

Ichord).
251.

A variety of commentators have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Cox, Foreword:

Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 55-70 (1980); Wright, Money
and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982); Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts:
Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 377 (1983); Forrester, The New Constitutional Right to Buy Elections, 69 A.B.A.J. 1078,
1080 (1983); Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent (book review),
93 YALE L.J. 581 (1984); Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 753,
753-759 (1988); Ashdown, Buying Speech: Campaign Spending, the New Politics, and Election
Law Reform, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 397 (1988); Nichol, Money, Equality and the Regulation of
Campaign Finance, 6 CONST. COMM. 319 (1989).
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comes. Within a few years, fourteen states had established some form
of public financing for state or local elections.2 52 By 1978, more than
thirty states had legislatively restricted corporate political activities.2" 3
For example, Massachusetts passed a law prohibiting corporations from
spending money to influence ballot measures,254 and Berkeley, California, passed an ordinance limiting campaign contributions to groups advocating or opposing ballot measures.2 55 A more recent, related development has been legislative concern with the practice of election-day
media projections made before the close of the polls. These projections
are thought to distort elections by deterring people from voting later in
the day because voters are made to feel that their votes will not affect
the election results. In response to this problem, the State of Washington prohibited exit polling on election day,2 56 and Congress has explored the possibility of establishing a uniform hour of poll closing in
national elections.2 57 Most recently, legislation has been introduced in
Congress to require presidential. candidates who accept public funds to
2 58
engage in a series of meaningful televised debates.
B.

Enhancement of Accuracy

Like Newtonian election laws banning violence, bribery, voter impersonation and the like, these money- and media-oriented laws can be
viewed as legislative attempts to enhance the accuracy of electoral outcomes and, by implication, the legitimacy of the elected government.
Consider the practice of media projections based on exit polls. Data
gatherers interview a scientifically selected sample of voters emerging
from polling places to determine how they voted. This information is
then processed through a model of the electorate's voting patterns, creating a set of statistics from which election results can be predicted. At
some point in the day, the operators of the model may feel sufficiently
252. Haughee, The FloridaElection Campaign FinancingAct: A Bold Approach to Public
Financingof Elections, 14 FLA. ST.,U.L. REV. 585, 586-87 (1986). The total had risen to 23 states
and the District of Columbia by 1986. Id. at 587.
253. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
254. Id.
255. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
256. Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988).
257. See S. 182, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. Sll, 818 (daily ed. Sept. 13,
1988).
258. S. 725, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S6042 (daily ed. June 1, 1989); H.R.
1733, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H980 (daily ed. April 6, 1989); see Markey &
Graham, Putting Their Mouths Where the Money Is, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1989, at A23, col. 2.
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confident to offer a prediction. This prediction is then broadcast over
radio and television, often hours before the polls are scheduled to close.
Consequently, many people who intend to vote, but who have not had a
chance to do so, may learn who "won" the election, creating a danger
that some voters will simply skip voting altogether on the theory that it
is too late for their vote to make any difference.25 g
Several different types of problems may surface due to such voter
abstention. First, of course, the pollsters can be wrong; one thinks of
the famous gaffe headline of the Chicago Tribune, "Dewey Wins." If
the pollsters turn out to be wrong, the deterrence of late votes can indeed influence the result of the election. Second, even if the projections
prove correct with respect to races in which projections are made, such
projections can deter voters from voting in other races, particularly local races and contests for lesser offices where no projection has been or
will be made. Critics of media projections claim that this actually happened during the November 1980 election when Ronald Reagan was
"declared" the winner on the basis of exit polling in eastern states at so
early an hour that many voters in western states decided not to vote,
thereby influencing the outcome of many state and local races.2 60
Third, the practice of predicting winners, even if it never affects the
results of any election, can lower voter participation. Lower participation has the potential, at least in a society demanding a high degree of
accuracy in its election results, to detract from the legitimacy of the
elected government. 6 ' Viewed in this light, the decision of the Washington legislature to adopt an exit-polling ban can be said to reflect a
legislative judgment that the dangers to governmental legitimacy posed
2 62
by media projections are sufficient to justify legislative intervention.
259. See generally DuVal, The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 579, 659-62
(1986); Comment, Restricting Election Day Exit Polling: Freedom of Expression vs. the Right to
Vote, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1003 (1990); Comment, Clearing CBS, Inc. v. Smith From the Path to
the Polls: A Proposal to Legitimize States' Interests in Restricting Exit Polls, 74 IOWA L. REV.
737 (1989); Note, Exit Polls and the First Amendment, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1927 (1985); Note,
Curtailment of Early Election Predictions: Can We Predict the Outcome?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV.
489 (1984).
260. See Duval, supra note 259, at 659-62; Prochnau, Angered California Voters May
Attempt to Beat the Clock in 1984, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1980, at A5, col. 1; Monday Night
Voting, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1980, at A22, col. 1.
261. An additional ill effect might be the creation of the damaging impression that elections
are determined by a tiny percentage of the voters, an impression that runs directly counter to the
theory of popular sovereignty and has the potential to reduce public confidence in government, an
interest the Supreme Court has found quite important. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27
(1976) (per curiam).
262. This was determined by the federal courts to have been at least one legislative purpose.
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Similarly, FECA and other campaign finance legislation can be
viewed at least in part as efforts to enhance the accuracy of electoral
outcomes. In one sense, the legislation can be seen merely as an attempt to ban what is, at bottom, a form of election-buying no different
from treating or outright bribery. The legislative goal in all such cases
is to prevent conditions from arising in which elections are won through
the pure and simple expenditure of money. Alternatively, campaign finance reform can be seen as a legislative rejection of the constitutional
sufficiency of electoral consent that is based on votes responsive to subliminal advertising rather than to substantive judgments by citizens.2 6
To characterize these laws as an enhancement of electoral accuracy is not by any means to suggest that they are, without more, constitutionally permissible. On the contrary, the analysis only begins here.
Many questions must first be answered. For example, what type of
electoral consent did the people of the United States feel would be adequate when they adopted the Constitution as their charter of self-'government? Was Congress correct in thinking when it enacted FECA
that voting decisions based on subliminal advertising are less desirable
than those based on reflection, and that an election won on the basis of
such votes might be of suspect legitimacy? Or does the constitutional
requirement that the people "choose" their agents mean only that they
need cast their votes free from direct and obvious duress? If the Constitution is ambiguous on that point, might it nevertheless grant to Congress the power to take a cautious approach toward practices that have
the potential to impair governmental legitimacy? Or is legitimacy too
important to leave to speculative congressional tinkering, and thus a
matter reserved entirely to the people?
Similar questions may be asked in the more specific case of exitpolling. The Constitution manifests popular consent to be governed by
a Congress composed of elected representatives. Would it make any
difference to the people's consent if senators and representatives elected
in the east were to win their seats through elections in which turnout
was much heavier than for congressional elections in the west due to
deterrence caused by early media projections? Although -we seem to
take for granted that the Constitution does not require full voter participation to confer a presumption of legitimacy on the winner of an election, might it nonetheless require some minimum level of participation?
See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 387 (9th Cir. 1988).
263. See P. PARTRIDGE, supra note 54, at 32 (#2).
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And are all causes for citizen abstention from the process of choosing
agents equal in the eyes of the United States (or Washington State's)
Constitution?
The Supreme Court has failed to address any of these questions in
deciding the constitutionality of modern election laws. Instead, the
Court has ignored the legitimacy side of the equation. Apparently
abandoning or finding inapplicable its historical commitment to "free"
and "pure" elections, the Court has analyzed these cases within a narrow first amendment framework. In so doing, the Court has developed
an unfortunate first amendment doctrine that all but precludes consideration of important questions about government legitimacy.
C. Judicial Treatment of Modern Election Laws
Unlike the earlier Newtonian election laws, which generally passed
rather easily through Supreme Court review, the new breed of election
laws encountered immediate trouble. In Buckley v. Valeo, 6 4 the first
judicial test of FECA, the Court struck down several important aspects
of the law, including limits on independent campaign expenditures by
individuals on behalf of candidates, and limits on the amount candidates could spend on themselves in running for office.2" 5 The Court
rested its decision on first amendment grounds, reasoning that the restriction of money intended for use as political speech was tantamount
to the restriction of political 'speech itself. In reaching its ruling, the
Court rejected as a justification for FECA's limitations on independent
and candidate expenditures the notion that equalizing campaign spending would ameliorate the problem of rich candidates overwhelming
their poorer rivals through the purchase of vast amounts of media advertising. "[T]he concept," the Court said, "that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. 2 6 This formulation has been the cornerstone of the Court's subsequent jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality' of election laws
that restrict speech or the money used to buy speech.
As noted above, FECA can be seen as an attempt to enhance the
accuracy of electoral outcomes by prohibiting election-buying through
264. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
265. Id. at 39-59. The Court, [however,] upheld a variety of limitations on political contributions, id. at 23-38, and certain reporting and disclosure requirements. Id. at 60-84. The Court
also upheld a system of public financing of presidential elections. Id. at 85-109.
266. Id. at 48-49.
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one-sided campaign expenditures, or, alternatively, by attempting to reduce the extent to which electoral outcomes turn on insubstantial voting decisions by citizens subject to massive political advertising campaigns. If one takes this view of FECA and similar laws, the Court's
interpretation of the first amendment in Buckley deals a devastating
blow to this particular variety of electoral fine-tuning because it depends quite directly on restricting the speech of some political actors so
as not to drown out the speech of others, to use the Court's analytical
framework.
Not surprisingly, other laws predicated on the same theory have
met similar fates under the Court's first amendment jurisprudence. In
FirstNational Bank v. Bellotti,26 7 the Court applied its rejection of the
"drowning out" theory of campaign finance reform to a law barring
independent expenditures by corporations concerning referenda. The
Court struck down the law as a violation of the first amendment. In
Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley,2 68 the Court used the same
reasoning to strike down a law restricting contributions to groups advocating or opposing ballot measures. In FederalElection Commission v.
6 9 the Court likeNational Conservative Political Action Committee,"
wise struck down a federal law restricting independent expenditures by
political action committees. And in Meyer v. Grant,270 the Court struck
down a Colorado law prohibiting the use of paid circulators of political
initiative petitions. The state justified the law partly on the ground that
it equalized political opportunity of rich and poor advocates of ballot
7 1
initiatives.1
The Court has so emphatically rejected any possibility of government limitations on independent expenditures by individuals or corporations that the focus of constitutional debate has shifted to the constitutionality of any type of government regulation of independent
expenditures, even those that do not impose any limit on the amount of
money that a corporation (much less an individual) may spend to advocate the election of a candidate for public office. In Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, Inc.,72 the Court held
unconstitutional the application of a modest regulatory scheme involv267. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
268. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
269. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
270. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
271.

Id. at 426 n.7.

272.

479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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ing a variety of accounting, reporting and disclosure requirements to a
nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of advocating a political viewpoint. On the other hand, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,2 73 the Court upheld the application of virtually identical

provisions of a Michigan election law to a nonprofit corporation whose
purposes were primarily economic rather than political.274 In an unusual departure, the Court frankly recognized what it called "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth" on the
political process, 27 1 prompting high-pitched dissents from Justices
Scalia and Kennedy accusing the majority of repudiating Buckley's response to the "drowning out" theory.2 76 The context of the decision,
however, makes clear that the majority thought itself to be doing nothing more than applying Buckley in the specialized context of corporate
spending.277
The lower courts have applied the Supreme Court's first amendment analysis with similar results. For example, in Daily HeraldCo. v.
Munro,2 78 the Ninth Circuit struck down the previously mentioned

Washington exit-poll ban. Apparently, it was so obvious to Washington
State's lawyers that the case fell within adverse Supreme Court precedent that*they denied that the purpose of the statute had anything to
273. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
274. Id. at 1395.
275. Id. at 1397.
276. See id. at 1410 (Scalia, J.,dissenting); id. at 1420 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
277. The majority specifically rejected the dissenters' contention that the law under review
involved an attempt "to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections," id. at 1397-98,
the feature of FECA that the Court so explicitly condemned in Buckley. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
Rather, the majority said, the law "ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the
political ideas espoused by corporations." Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398; cf Federal Election Comm'n
v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 479 U.S. at 257-59. In the same paragraph, however, the
majority held that "the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of
large treasuries warrants" the law's application to corporations because they can "unfairly influence elections when [that wealth] is deployed in the form of independent expenditures." Austin,
110 S. Ct. at 1398. It is this language that the dissenters pounced on as implicitly repudiating
Buckley, and the majority, although vague at critical points in its discussion, certainly does little
to dispel the impression that what is bad about corporate spending is the ability of corporations to
outspend individuals in the marketplace of ideas-precisely the justification for government interference in the laissez-faire political marketplace that the Court rejected in Buckley, Belotti, and
subsequent cases. Nevertheless, it seems clear enough from the narrow context of the Court's
opinion and its direct reaffirmation of Buckley both here and in other recent cases, see, e.g.,
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 428 (1988), that the rejection of the "drowning out" theory is still
quite safely ensconced in the Court's election law jurisprudence.
278. 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988).
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do with -restricting advance media projections of election winners,2' 9
surely the only remotely sensible basis for the legislation. Nevertheless,
the district court found this to be the true purpose of the law, and the
court of appeals, assuming such a purpose, found it constitutionally
"impermissible." 2' 0 Thus, the first amendment has now been invoked
not only to defeat an election regulation designed to enhance electoral
accuracy, but to eliminate altogether the enhancement of electoral accuracy and governmental legitimacy as permissible grounds for any
election law when that law touches anything that the Supreme Court
defines as speech.2 81
D. Free Speech and the Lockean Constitution: Toward a Judicial
Approach to Modern Election Laws
The Supreme Court's approach in these cases is seriously flawed.
This is true not so much because of the results it has reached-though
the results are disturbing indeed to those who view unrestricted campaign expenditures as a serious taint of the electoral system-but because of the Court's complete failure to consider the benefits modern
elections laws were thought to have for electoral accuracy and for what
the Court had previously called "free" and "pure" elections. If congressional critics of election campaign tactics were correct, those tactics
represented a potentially serious threat to popular sovereignty. Government by the rich, or by the media, is not popular self-government, and
it is hardly intuitively clear why we should interpret the Constitution to
permit election laws designed to prevent government by whites over
blacks, but not to prevent government by the well-funded over the lesswell-funded, or by the media-connected over the media-unconnected.
In this section, I shall invoke the Lockean theory of popular sovereignty one last time to outline two approaches the Court could take to
better accommodate the interests implicated by modern election laws.
1.

The First Amendment in Lockean Perspective: Two Views

As we have seen, the Lockean theory of popular sovereignty states
that the people are free to structure their government as they see fit,
279. Id. at 387. The state insisted that the purpose of the statute was to prevent disruption
of the polling place, an interest found by the court to be inadequately served by the statute. Id. at
385.
280. Id. at 387.
281. See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (striking down ban on election day
political endorsements by newspapers).
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and to delegate to their governmental agents as much or as little power
as they wish those agents to exercise. In the particular system of popular instructions to government that makes up our Constitution, there
can be no doubt that the first amendment occupies an important place.
The sheer sweep of the amendment's ban on governmental abridgement
of speech, an activity that touches almost every aspect of daily life,
inevitably renders the first amendment a significant constraint on the
exercise of governmental power.
Deciding how to resolve conflicts between laws implementing legitimate government interests and the first amendment's expressed preference for free speech is difficult enough under any circumstances; the
problem takes on an added dimension when the government interest at
stake is as fundamental to our political system as the maintenance of
governmental legitimacy. A further complication arises from the fact
that the first amendment is sometimes thought to be designed to
achieve goals closely related to legitimacy and popular sovereignty, but
is also sometimes thought to be aimed at entirely different social
objectives.
The Lockean theory outlined earlier suggests at least two ways to
address these conflicts in the context of modern election laws. I shall
call these alternatives, respectively, strong Lockeanism and weak
Lockeanism.
a. Strong Lockeanism
Strong Lockeanism, as I shall use the phrase here, signifies an approach to constitutional interpretation that focuses on the fundamental
role of popular sovereignty and governmental legitimacy in our system
of government. Strong Lockeanism, recognizing the great importance
of popular sovereignty and governmental legitimacy, makes those values the basis for an inference that the Constitution must generally be
construed to advance their achievement. The strong Lockean thus approaches a problem of constitutional interpretation with the inclination
either to interpret the particular constitutional provision in question to
be consistent with the promotion or maintenance of governmental legitimacy, or, if such an interpretation is impossible, to resolve conflicts
between constitutional commands in a way that favors legitimacy because of its importance in the constitutional scheme.
Before examining the contours of a strong Lockean approach to
the first amendment, I would like to be clear about what such an approach would not involve. In its iost extreme form, strong Lockeanism
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might suggest the hard-line position that popular sovereignty and legitimacy are the most important constitutional values, bar none; that every
provision of the Constitution must be read as subservient to those ends;
and that all other values without exception yield in a conflict, regardless of the circumstances. This "Godzilla" approach, however, in which
the pursuit of governmental legitimacy tramples everything in its path,
would be both unreasonable and unjustifiable even within the bounds of
the Lockean theory of popular sovereignty. First, the people, as they
make clear in the preamble to the Constitution, have other aspirations
besides the achievement of legitimate self-government, aspirations
which they would probably be unwilling to sacrifice in some singleminded pursuit of a state of perfect self-rule. For example, just because
stealing ballots threatens governmental legitimacy does not necessarily
mean that the people would be willing to tolerate warrantless searches
aimed at discovering stolen ballots, or the torturing of suspected vote
thieves to elicit confessions. Second, popular sovereignty is itself only a
means to an end: individuals undertake the burdens and responsibilities
of life in organized society in order to live some sort of good life-a life
free, at a minimum, from the fear of physical harm and anxiety associated with the state of nature.28 2 To elevate legitimacy and popular sovereignty strictly above the achievement of such basic human goals is to
confuse the means of attaining such goals with the goals themselves.
To be workable, even a strong Lockeanism must be more reasonable in its approach to resolving constitutional issues. Such an approach
might hold that the achievement and maintenance of governmental legitimacy and popular sovereignty are extremely important goals that
occupy preferred, though not always dominant, positions in the constitutional scheme. The strong Lockean would accordingly attempt to
read constitutional provisions to be consistent with the achievement of
popular sovereignty and legitimacy, and would be inclined to resolve
disputes in their favor, but would simultaneously attempt to avoid doing violence to the text, or to impede unduly the achievement of competing constitutional values.
Specifically, then, how might a strong Lockean read the first
amendment? Unfortunately, the first amendment poses enormous analytical difficulties. Its language is both broad and vague, and the reasons for its adoption, along with the adoption of the rest of the Bill of
282. See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (democratic
self-government is only a means of attaining individual self-realization).
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Rights, remain frustratingly inaccessible due to the lack of pertinent
legislative history or other contemporaneous accounts. 8 3 Nevertheless,
scholars and the Supreme Court have advanced several useful competing theories of the first amendment. In one view, the first amendment
implements a societal commitment to a "marketplace of ideas" as a
vehicle for discovering truth. 84 In another view, the constitutional
guarantee of free speech is meant to protect the ability of individual
members of society to achieve "self-fulfillment" through speech.28 5 A
third view holds that free speech serves to "check" governmental excesses. 286 However, the theory of the first amendment that would undoubtedly hold the greatest appeal for the strong Lockean is the view
stating that the Constitution protects free speech because free speech is
28 7
essential to the realization of popular self-government.
According to Alexander Meiklejohn, the principal architect of the
self-government theory of the first amendment, the first amendment
protects speech because speech is a proxy for "the freedom of those
activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.' "28 Although the Constitution appears to confine the role of the people in
governing themselves to voting in elections,
in the deeper meaning of the Constitution, voting is merely the external expres-

sion of a wide and diverse number of activities by means of which citizens at-

tempt to meet the responsibilities of making judgments, which that freedom to

govern lays upon them. .

. .Self-government

can exist only insofar as the voters

acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.2 89

These qualities, in Meiklejohn's view, are acquired through speech and
283.

See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.01 (1984). See generally D.
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 219-252 (1990) (account of

FARBER & S. SHERRY,

the ratification of the Bill of Rights).
284. The classic statement of this idea is that of Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
285. See M. NIMMER, supra note 283, § 1.03 (see cases cited).
286. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.FOUND. RES. J.
521.
287. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.REV. 245, 255. See also supra
notes 89-102 and accompanying text. The checking function theory might also appeal to the
strong Lockean insofar as that theory views the employment of speech by the people as a means of

exercising a "veto power" over government actions that do not meet with popular approval. Blasi,
supra note 286, at 542.

288. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
289.

Id.
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activities associated with speech, such as reading and writing. Thus, the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment is tantamount to
the constitutional denial to government of the power "to abridge the
freedom of the electoral power of the people."2 90
This analysis fits well into a strong Lockean approach to the first
amendment. If the constitutional guarantee of free speech has anything
at all to do with governmental legitimacy, it can only be because the
first amendment reflects a societal belief in the role of speech in the
attainment of legitimacy. Although this proposition need not be true in
the abstract-even a government that restricts its citizens' speech can
be legitimate if it has the consent of the governed-the linkage between
speech and legitimacy takes on considerable force in a republic, where
the people exercise an important aspect of their sovereignty at frequent
elections.2 91 Elections, as indicated previously, are the means by which
the people select their agents. Speech can play a significant role in the
way such agents are selected: it is implicated in the identification of
potential candidates for office and the bringing to public attention of
their candidacies, as well as in the processes by which voters inform
themselves about and debate the merits of the candidates and their positions for purposes of making electoral choices. As we have seen, the
processes by which elections are conducted are intimately linked to
governmental legitimacy because electoral procedures and processes
can affect the degree to which electoral outcomes accurately reflect the
consent of the governed. 292 For the strong Lockean, then, the first
amendment is not only consistent with the general constitutional goal
of protecting popular sovereignty and governmental legitimacy, but actually protects speech in order to achieve those very goals.
This perceived congruence between the requirements of popular
sovereignty and the first amendment makes cases involving modern
elections laws rather easy for the strong Lockean. Consider once again
the ban on exit polling at issue in Daily Herald Co. v. Munro.29 a Assume that the purpose behind the ban was to prevent advance media
projections of election winners in order to prevent the deterrence of late
voting by voters who may incorrectly think, after hearing such projections, that their votes will make no difference. 29 4 Whereas the Ninth
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 256-57.
See supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128-53 and accompanying text.
838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
When the government seeks to justify a restriction on speech on the ground that its
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Circuit applied Supreme Court doctrine to strike down this law as an
impermissible restriction of speech protected by the first amendment,
the application of strong Lockeanism would require a different result.
The exit poll ban promotes electoral accuracy because it is designed to
prevent the skewing of electoral outcomes through the deterrence of
late voting-that is, the ban increases the chances that the person who
wins the election will be the one in fact preferred by a majority of those
citizens who wish to play a role in selecting the winner.2 95 Promoting
electoral accuracy in turn promotes governmental legitimacy, a highly
important, if not paramount, government interest. Although the law
doubtless restricts the speech of broadcasters and thus implicates the
first amendment, it does not violate the first amendment because the
Constitution, for the strong Lockean, should not in general be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the achievement or promotion of
legitimacy. In this case, moreover, such an interpretation is quite natural because, under the self-government theory, the first amendment
protects speech for the very purpose of protecting governmental legitimacy and the popular sovereignty on which it rests. As a result, the law
survives constitutional scrutiny from the perspective of strong
Lockeanism.
effect on speech is merely incidental to the pursuit of some other goal unrelated to the suppression
of speech, the Supreme Court has typically required that the restriction advance the non-speech
goal with some degree of efficiency or directness. E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (law restricting expressive conduct must further a substantial government interest), reh'g
denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968). This'is a useful requirement, and I assume here that a ban on exitpolls would further the goal of making electoral outcomes as accurate as possible by minimizing
the deterrence of late voting that results from early election projections. Presumably these assumptions would be open to challenge in actual litigation over such a law. In some cases, the
assumptions underlying federal campaign finance reform laws have been criticized as unrealistic.
For example, it has been suggested that the type of reforms contained in the Federal Election
Campaign Act have the undesirable effect of entrenching incumbent officials, and thus worsen
rather than improve the problems Congress was trying to correct. See, e.g., Romano, Metapolitics
and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 990-91 (1984); BeVier, Money and Politics:
A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1045,
1074-81 (1985). For a variety of views concerning the effects of campaign finance reform, see
Frameworks of Analysis and Proposalsfor Reform: A Symposium on Campaign Finance, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 213 (1989).
295. In our society, as in others in which voting is not mandatory, cf. supra note 156 (examples of compulsory voting laws), elected officials have always been taken to derive their legitimate
entitlement to office from having received a majority of votes cast, regardless of whether all citizens actually vote.
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Weak Lockeanism

Weak Lockeanism, as I shall use the term here, differs from strong
Lockeanism in that it focuses not on the importance of popular sovereignty in our system of government-a proposition indisputable for
Lockeans of any stripe-but on the concrete ways in which popular
sovereignty actually influences the shape of the Constitution and its
provisions. For the weak Lockean, the only impact of the theory of popular sovereignty on the Constitution lies in the fact that the Constitution must be viewed as a creation of the people, and therefore as a
reflection of their particular preferences for governmental structure and
distribution of powers, whatever those preferences may be. The fact
that governmental legitimacy is crucial to the maintenance of popular
sovereignty does not necessarily suggest, from the perspective of weak
Lockeanism, that the people have crafted a Constitution that affords
ample protection to the achievement of legitimacy, nor does it furnish
any basis for assuming that any particular constitutional provision
ought to be taken to advance that goal. For the weak Lockean, each
provision of the Constitution simply is what it is, regardless of its consistency with any overarching political theory.
The weak Lockean, then, 'would try to approach the task of interpreting the first amendment with a good deal of sensitivity and care
and, to the extent possible, without excessive ideological baggage. A
weak Lockean analysis might take the following form. The first amendment, as noted above, poses formidable interpretational difficulties, and
its actual effect, if any, on the original, basic constitutional scheme of
government is far from clear. Nevertheless, students of the first amendment seem to agree that its adoption did not represent a sudden national change of course within a mere two years of the ratification of
the Constitution. If anything, the Bill of Rights seems to have been
intended by its drafters and ratifiers to fulfill and complete the original
constitutional plan rather than to alter it.2 96 If this interpretation is
296. L. LEVY, CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 105-06 (1986).
The framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted a bill of rights despite considerable popular
sentiment to the contrary. Although almost every state had adopted some sort of declaration of

rights at the time of the Revolution, see 1 B. SCHWARTZ,

THE BILL OF RIGHTS:

A

DOCUMENTARY

231-379 (1971), the framers of the federal Constitution viewed a bill of rights as superfluous: "why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?" asked Hamilton. THE FEDERALIST, No. 94, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Moreover, they
feared that the inclusion of a bill of rights might even be dangerous because the enumeration of
specific constraints on governmental powers could give rise to the unacceptable inference that any
government action not specifically constrained was permitted. Id. at 513-514.
HISTORY
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correct, it means, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the first amendment
does not brutely subordinate all other constitutional values to that of
free speech. 97 Instead, the first amendment identifies free speech as a

highly important constitutional value that must take its place alongside
other important constitutional values. The Court's opinions in the first
amendment area reflect such a view, identifying numerous contexts in
which free speech must yield to other constitutional imperatives.2 98

Given the somewhat ambiguous or fluid position of free speech in
the hierarchy of constitutional values, the situations in which one considers free speech values to outweigh other constitutional considerations, and vice versa, will depend in large part on one's theory of what
purposes the first amendment is meant to serve in the constitutional
scheme. The self-government theory of the first amendment has a distinctly Lockean ring, and thus holds some attraction even for the weak
Lockean. The theory fits in nicely with the notion that the first amendment did not significantly alter the original constitutional scheme; it
also suggests the appealingly symmetrical possibility that the first
amendment was added to the Constitution in order to reinforce the
scheme of Lockean popular sovereignty implemented by the basic constitutional framework.
Weak Lockeanism, however, cautions against embracing an interpretation of the Constitution simply because that interpretation is conThis reasoning immediately proved unacceptable to the public. See L. LEVY, supra, at 11218. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and North Carolina all transmitted
along with their messages of ratification a suggestion that the Constitution be amended to include
a bill of rights. Id. at 117. When the first Congress passed what became the first ten amendments
to the Constitution, their purpose was thus not to alter the structure of the original document, but
to correct a serious omission integral to the original plan. Id. at 119-34; see also Anderson, The
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 455, 476-77 (1983). As Governor John Hancock
told the Massachusetts Legislature in presenting the proposed amendments for ratification, "it is
the ardent wish of every patriot, that the [constitutional] plan may be as compleat as human
wisdom can effect it." 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 1173.
This view of the relation of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution plays an important role in
the current debate over the meaning of the ninth amendment. See, e.g., Barnett, Reconceiving the
Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1988); Symposium on Interpretingthe Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 37 (1988).
297. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) ("the societal value of
speech must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations").
298. E.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (free
speech yields to government interest in maintaining attractive and useful public park); United
States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (free
speech yields to government interest in competent, professional work force); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (free speech may yield in some circumstances to government interest in national security).
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sistent with the popular sovereignty theory. On the contrary, if popular
sovereignty means anything to the weak Lockean, it means that the
people are free to structure their government in any way they see fit,
whether their way is consistent and sensible, or inconsistent and foolish.
Thus, while it may be .the case that the people adopted the first amendment in order to protect their ability to govern themselves, it is certainly possible that they decided to bar government abridgement of free
speech for quite different reasons, including self-fulfillment, the search
for truth, or any combination of these and other rationales that have
been suggested for the first amendment. As a result, there is no definitive way to determine, without knowing more, where the first amendment places free speech in the hierarchy of constitutional values. From
the perspective of weak Lockeanism, this means that there is no interpretational short-cut to deciding whether in any given context the constitutional commitment to free speech outweighs the constitutional
commitment to governmental legitimacy.
In spite of this difficulty, the theory of popular sovereignty can
assist in analyzing such problems. Lockean theory tells us that there
are substantial risks involved in structuring a government in a way that
subordinates the requirement of governmental legitimacy to other values, including free speech. It tells us that when a constitutional system,
for whatever reason, permits leaders to take power who do not in fact
govern with the consent of the governed, the government and all its
acts can be illegitimate and therefore not entitled to obedience. The
result in extreme cases could be political slavery or anarchy, perhaps
accompanied by dangers comparable to ,those which the people banded
into society in order to escape in the first place. While there is nothing
to prevent a people from making choices about the structure and power
of its government that raise the risks associated with illegitimacy, the
magnitude of the risks suggests that we ought not to impute to any
people a casual attitude toward the making of such choices. In other
words, a people may choose in making their constitution to elevate
other values, such as free speech, over the maintenance of strict governmental legitimacy, and may have entirely valid reasons for doing so.
Yet we should reach such a constitutional interpretation only after the
most penetrating scrutiny because it represents a choice by the people
ordinarily to be avoided: the choice to. risk erosion of popular sovereignty itself, the very thing that makes government possible at all, in
order to pursue some other societal goal.
This reasoning seems especially appropriate with respect to the
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United States Constitution. Our nation was founded in the belief that
"it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their
conduct and example, to decide the important question whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government
'
from reflection and choice." 299
The people of this nation set out deliberately to create for themselves a good and lasting government, and they
reflected at considerable length on how best to accomplish that purpose. Accordingly, we should be extremely cautious, if not downright
reluctant, to accept interpretations of the Constitution that put the nation at risk due to a subordination of the maintenance of governmental
legitimacy to other constitutional values, even values as worthy in their
own right as free speech.
It should be clear by now that the application of weak Lockeanism
in a particular factual setting requires a complex approach sensitive to
nuance. Because the Court has never really dealt with the issues that
confront the weak Lockean, such an analysis would have to be conducted almost from scratch, a task impossible here. Consequently, I
shall confine myself to attempting briefly to impart some flavor for how
a weak Lockean might analyze a particular modern election law such
as the exit-poll ban discussed earlier.
For weak Lockeanism the first amendment merely is what it is,
regardless of the dictates of political theory or internal constitutional
consistency. The weak Lockean therefore must either determine definitively what the first amendment is "about," or, as the Court so frequently does, duck that difficult issue by determining that it makes no
difference in this particular case what the first amendment is about
because the result is the same under any reasonable interpretation of
the amendment. Fortunately, the easy way out is available here.
Consider again three of the major competing theories of the first
amendment: the marketplace of ideas, self-fulfillment and self-government. If the first amendment is intended to establish a marketplace of
ideas aimed at discovering and testing truth or claims to truth, to what
extent does an exit-poll ban conflict with that goal? Exit-polls are the
basis for projections of election winners, which are claims about who is
going to win an election and by how much. But unlike many claims to
truth, which are not susceptible to authoritative adjudication, the claim
that a particular person won an election by a particular margin can
and will be answered definitively by counting the ballots. Thus, to re299.

THE

FEDERALIST,

No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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strict this one' type of media speculation about. election results impairs
society's ability to determine the true election winner only to a negligible degree, if at all. When this marginal or nonexistent impediment to
the goal of the first amendment worked by the exit-poll ban is weighed
against the threat to legitimacy posed by the distortion of voting patterns and election results associated with media projections, the weak
Lockean is likely to conclude that the general constitutional goal of
assuring governmental legitimacy outweighs the first amendment interest in speech in this particular situation. The law is therefore
constitutional.
The weak Lockean is likely to reach the same conclusion even if
the first amendment is concerned more with self-fulfillment than with
the marketplace of ideas. First, to the extent that the impact of an exitpoll ban falls on news organizations and broadcast networks, the first
amendment is not implicated at all: Lockean theory states that society's
membership is confined to individuals, and if the first amendment exists
to allow the self-fulfillment of individual members of society, corporations simply do not qualify for the protection. 0 Second, even if the
impact of the ban can be characterized as falling on individual journalists, their fulfillment interests are served only weakly by their ability to
make advance projections of election winners. On one hand, if their
fulfillment interest lies in telling the world who won the election, that
interest can be achieved only a few hours after it first arises by reporting the actual Winners based on vote tabulations, or perhaps by making
projections based on surveys taken after the polls' are closed. On the
other hand, if journalists' interests consist precisely in stating who won
the election before that fact is authoritatively known, their interest begins to look suspiciously like an interest in influencing the results-exactly the harm the exit-poll ban is designed to prevent. 30 1 It
seems doubtful that the fulfillment interests protected by the first
300. A case contrary to this position is First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), in
which the Court decided that the protection of instances of speech was more important than the
identity of the speaker. The Court, however, seemed to rely'more on a self-government theory of
the first amendment than on a self-fulfillment theory in the circumstances of the case. Id. at 77677. Cf. id. at 825-28 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting) (corporations have diminished first amendment
rights); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.y. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1986) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (corporations have no first amendment interest in freedom of thought and
conscience).
301. Journalists, of course, may have other economic interests that arise from being able to
advertise their speed and accuracy of reporting election results, and may hope this translates into
higher ratings. These interests, however, are not first amendment self-fulfillment interests.
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amendment would extend to interference with the interests of all citizens in accurate elections designed to secure legitimate self-government. 302 In either case, the weak Lockean is likely to view these minor
inroads on first amendment protections as insufficient to outweigh the
risks associated with inaccurate electoral outcomes.
Finally, if the first amendment is designed principally to secure
popular self-government, the exit-poll ban is likely to survive scrutiny
under weak Lockeanism for the reasons mentioned in conjunction with
strong Lockeanism. Thus, the weak Lockean is able to conclude that
Washington's exit-poll ban does not violate the first amendment because under any reasonable theory of the amendment's function and
purpose, the government interests in banning exit polls either outweighs
any countervailing interests in the ability of the media to make advance
election projections, or simply does not conflict in any meaningful. way
with the goals of the first amendment.
2.

Judicial Analysis of Modern Election Laws

At present, the Court seems to have trapped itself in a mode of
analysis that not only holds no place for considerations of governmental
legitimacy, but also views such claims as inconsistent with some fundamental aspect of the first amendment. Paradoxically, the Court has at
the same time acknowledged that the achievement of self-government
is an important goal served by the constitutional protection of free
speech. 30 3 This schizophrenic outlook has led the Court to the ironic
pass of employing a constitutional provision aimed at assuring self-government in such a way as to defeat self-government. The Court's approach holds that the protection of speech in the service of popular
sovereignty requires the protection of speech that defeats popular sovereignty. The unfortunate consequence is the impairment of the ability of
society's agents to identify accurately the objects of popular consent.
Either of the approaches outlined in the previous section would
represent a significant improvement over the current state of the
302.

Alternatively, journalists could claim that their interest in self-fulfillment consists in

saying what they want whenever they want. This is a weak claim, for the first amendment right to
speak for the purposes of self-fulfillment must be subject to some limitation when the speech
begins to harm others who will not be similarly fulfilled. Any other reading would render the first
amendment. a prescription for anarchy. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment

Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971) (noting that fulfillment rationale provides no basis for distinguishing speech from any other human activity).
303. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam).
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Court's analysis of modern election laws. Both strong Lockeanism and
weak Lockeanism have the advantage of recognizing that the promotion of governmental legitimacy is a substantial government interest,
and that this interest is served by laws that enhance the accuracy of
electoral outcomes. Even in its weak form, the Lockean theory of popular sovereignty recognizes that the risks associated with illegitimate
government are not lightly undertaken by a people deeply concerned
with its own safety and freedom.
If conducted in this or some similar way, judicial review of election laws would well serve the goals of popular sovereignty. The Lockean approach allows the people's representatives to keep the reins of
government firmly in the people's hands. Furthermore, this approach
,gives effect to any deliberate, contrary choices of the people to limit the
power of their representatives to assure the people's control over their
government.
V.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to show in this Article that the Constitution reflects or
embodies a theory of popular sovereignty that is. at bottom Lockean
because under it governmental legitimacy depends upon the consent of
the governed. This leads inevitably to the conclusion that elections play
a direct role in the establishment and maintenance of governmental legitimacy in a republic because elections are the means by which a vital
element of popular consent is expressed and implemented. Because
elections are necessarily governed by election laws and procedures,
those laws and procedures influence the legitimacy of the elected government in proportion to their ability to identify accurately the particular individuals chosen by the people as their agents and to whose rule
the people have in fact consented.
Although the Supreme Court has rarely approached election laws
with much sensitivity to their role in the constitutional system of Lockean popular sovereignty-a definite shortcoming in its jurisprudence-the Court's early decisions upholding the "Newtonian" Variety
of election laws are at least consistent with the high regard in which
such laws might be expected to be held. However, in its decisions reviewing modern election laws that affect speech or the spending of
money used to buy electoral speech, the Court has repeatedly struck
down election laws on first amendment grounds. These decisions, which
again do not recognize the Lockean implications of the laws under review, not only fail to recognize the weighty governmental interest in
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assuring and enhancing governmental legitimacy, but also rely on the
first amendment to erect what Comes close to a presumption against the
constitutionality of such laws; the result is a judicial reading into the
Constitution of a bias against the legislative achievement of electoral
accuracy and, by implication, against the achievement of a high degree
of assurance of governmental legitimacy.
In order to avoid this potentially dangerous result, the Court needs
to reexamine its first amendment decisions in cases dealing with laws
aimed at enhancing electoral accuracy through the indirect regulation
of speech. In so doing, the Court needs to acknowledge at least to some
degree the constitutional aspects of popular sovereignty-to recover in
its latest constitutional decisions the sensitivity to the fundamental theory of the Constitution it displayed in its earliest constitutional decisions, and to abandon approaches to interpreting the Constitution that
fail to acknowledge the nature and purposes of the document itself.

